User Centricity by Boudaoud, Karima
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 1 of 65 
 
 
 
 
D4.5 BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical 
Working Groups (WGs) 
Grant Agreement number: 25258655 
Project acronym: BIC 
Project title: Building International Cooperation for Trustworthy ICT: Security, Privacy and 
Trust in Global Networks & Services. 
Funding Scheme: ICT-2009.1.4 [Trustworthy ICT] 
Project co-ordinator name, title and organisation:  
James Clarke, Programme Manager, Waterford Institute of Technology  
Tel: +353 71 9166628 
Fax:  + 353 51 341100 
E-mail: jclarke@tssg.org 
Project website address: http://www.bic-trust.eu  
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 2 of 65 
 
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 3 
1. Aims and Objectives ................................................................................................... 4 
2. Drivers for International Cooperation .......................................................................... 5 
2.1 The rationale for International cooperation ........................................................... 5 
2.2 Strategic Approach for international cooperation .................................................. 5 
2.3 Key elements for International Cooperation ......................................................... 6 
2.4 Stakeholders, Mechanisms & Frameworks .......................................................... 8 
2.4.1 Europe ......................................................................................................... 8 
2.4.2 Brazil .......................................................................................................... 11 
2.4.3 South Africa ................................................................................................ 12 
2.4.4 India ........................................................................................................... 12 
2.5 Success metrics / Impact evaluation .................................................................. 14 
2.6 The Way Forward .............................................................................................. 17 
3. Break out session Work Group reports ..................................................................... 19 
3.1 WG1. Human oriented/citizen approaches for trust, privacy and security ........... 19 
3.1.1 Chair/Rapporteur Introduction .................................................................... 19 
3.1.2 User centricity ............................................................................................ 19 
3.1.3 Privacy and Data protection ....................................................................... 20 
3.1.4 Trust management in secure software ........................................................ 21 
3.1.5 Accountability in Cloud computing .............................................................. 23 
3.1.6 Data Provenance........................................................................................ 26 
3.1.7 Social computing in emerging countries ..................................................... 27 
3.1.8 Global perspectives of personalized Identity Management 
Ecosystem (GINI-SA vision) ...................................................................................... 28 
3.1.9 Photos from the session ............................................................................. 30 
3.2 WG2. Network Information Security / cyber security .......................................... 30 
3.2.1 Chair/Rapporteur Introduction .................................................................... 30 
3.2.2 Emerging threats and actors ...................................................................... 32 
3.2.3 International Data exchange architecture for cooperation on cyber 
security and intelligence ............................................................................................ 33 
3.2.4 International Approaches to cryptography .................................................. 38 
3.2.5 Mobile Security ........................................................................................... 39 
3.2.6 International approaches to critical infrastructure protection ....................... 43 
3.2.7 Security and virtualisation ........................................................................... 44 
3.2.8 Implications arising from identity and privacy related issues on a 
global scale ............................................................................................................... 47 
3.2.9 Internet of Things ....................................................................................... 49 
3.2.9 Photos from the session ............................................................................. 51 
4. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 52 
5. Further information ................................................................................................... 55 
5.1 References ........................................................................................................ 55 
5.2 Link to the Workshop Webpage, where all slides can be found. ......................... 56 
5.3 Reminder list of upcoming events ...................................................................... 56 
5.4 Registered Attendees......................................................................................... 57 
Annexe 1. UN Resolution – Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity........................... 59 
Annexe 2. Proposal for Coordination and Multi-Lateral Approach in International 
Cooperation .............................................................................................................. 62 
 
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 3 of 65 
 
Executive Summary 
At the 1st BIC Annual Forum1 in November 2011, a key recommendation was made for 
enhanced coordination and information-sharing across the variety of bi-lateral International 
Cooperation (INCO) activities sponsored by the European Commission. As BIC spans 
multiple countries with a unique multi-lateral profile, BIC decided to further this 
recommendation by hosting a workshop that brings together the multiple projects and 
stakeholders that are already engaged in International cooperation 
International Cooperation in the area of cyber-security is beginning to develop: the global 
approach is urgently needed because there is ultimately just one, single, global information 
communications and technologies environment, consisting of the interdependent networks 
of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. It is essential that, 
in addition to robust system defences, we have the ability to conduct comprehensive 
intelligence collection and evaluation on any developing cyber-threat, followed by near-
simultaneous processing, exploiting and disseminating of the information to activate our 
response. This depends on multi-stakeholders engaged in collaboration, including data 
exchange and sharing (and also knowledge sharing) between countries. 
One of the main objectives during the workshop was to discuss how to move from a more 
tactical based approach (bi-lateral) towards a more strategic approach (multi-lateral 
approach), although no clear procedure on how it can be done was identified, when for 
instance a particular research topic, e.g. cyber security, needs to be addressed globally and 
multi-laterally amongst many regions and the bi-lateral approach may not be suited for this 
type of longer term strategic activity. It was agreed that this needs to be addressed 
especially by the programme management and funding stakeholders. 
A number of key elements are essential to be considered from the outset to establish the 
objectives and manage cooperation, duly taking into consideration the challenges. The  UN 
Resolution 57/239 from 2003. Creation of a global culture of cyber security, (attached as 
Annexe 1) called for the sort of international cooperation and collaboration envisaged by 
the workshop. 
A successful set-up of a framework for international cooperation calls for consideration of 
the inevitable complexities and multiple dimensions requires: an inclusive and pervasive 
approach, clear scope of work, appropriate management structure, focus, vision, mission 
and target, etc. and, of course, funding. 
Different FP7 initiatives, and approaches to international cooperation foreseen in H2020 
were addressed during the workshop, as well as the approaches of other funding agencies 
and initiatives connected to ICT trust and security in BIC related countries: Brazil (CNPq, 
CTIC, FUNTEL), South Africa (DST, CSIR, NRF, SPII) and India (the main one is DIT). 
Interesting discussions on a variety of several hot issues including the identification of 
“success metrics” for international cooperation and collaboration were held in the 
workshops. The difficulty of this task was acknowledged by most participants, as countries 
have different ways and mechanisms for carrying out Research and Technological 
Development (RTD) management, funding, plans and implementations, and also the 
success metrics can refer to several levels (market results, new standards, technologies, 
policies, regional knowledge interchanges, amongst others). 
                                               
 
1  http://www.bic-trust.eu/events/1st-bic-annual-forum/ 
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1. Aims and Objectives 
The European Commission is advocating and supporting strong cooperation internationally, 
with the following objectives:  
1. To jointly develop ICT solutions to international societal and economic challenges 
relating to the security and trustworthiness of the global ICT systems, services and 
infrastructures; 
2. To jointly respond to major global technological and operational challenges by 
developing interoperable solutions and standards; 
3. To improve scientific and technological cooperation for mutual benefit. 
At the 1st BIC Annual Forum2 in November 2011, a key recommendation was made for 
enhanced coordination and information-sharing across the variety of bi-lateral International 
Cooperation (INCO) activities sponsored by the European Commission. As BIC spans 
multiple countries with a unique multi-lateral profile, BIC aims to further this 
recommendation by hosting a workshop that brings together the multiple projects and 
stakeholders that are already engaged in International cooperation with the intent to: 
• Explore the insights and common experiences across projects; 
• Identifying, discussing and assessing (a) key challenges, issues and priorities; and 
(b) mechanisms for international cooperation that are already available; 
• Explore possible synergistic approaches for mutual collaboration, cooperation and 
organising future joint INCO research activities and its supporting programmes. 
The Workshop spanned two full days.  It aimed to achieve the following concrete outcomes: 
• From the experiences and insights of the participants, determine the ways to move 
forward on international cooperation, and future calls for collaborative research; 
• Forming the current bi-lateral (and potentially overlapping) country to country 
cooperation into a comprehensive and coordinated global cooperation; 
• Compiling a who’s who directory of agency and research contacts across the  
countries; 
• Identification of “success metrics” for international cooperation and collaboration: 
– rationale – motives and goals – engagement in international cooperation; 
– success criteria with regard to results; 
– analysis and assessment of INCO impact. 
• First face to face meeting of the three Working Groups of BIC. 
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2. Drivers for International Cooperation 
2.1 The rationale for International cooperation 
As strategic technology competition among nation states for national advantage intensifies, 
an ideological divide could emerge between the like-minded democracies and more 
authoritarian states, centred on values of Internet freedom, respect for intellectual property, 
privacy, data protection, and free and fair economic competition. 
This conflict of views arises against the backdrop of a dramatic build out of vulnerable ICT 
products that has created easy opportunities for malicious action, and enabled largely 
unchecked cyber crime, extensive industrial espionage, and dangerous foundations for 
cyber conflict. 
As digital societies become ever more reliant on ICT, careless outsourcing of protection of 
freedom, privacy and security is a recipe for strategic loss.  In this environment, it is more 
important than ever for the democracies to retain technological leadership so that all can 
benefit from safer products that protect individual freedom, intellectual investments, and 
privacy. Like-minded countries need to develop universal norms for system engineering 
and for design certification. They need to produce high-integrity products reflecting these 
principles as they drive ICT standards that reduce opportunities for bad cyber behaviour, 
while enhancing international stability, and promoting orderly international interactions.  
With this in mind, from the European perspective, cooperation with third countries and 
international organisations has been and will be promoted with the following objectives: 
• strengthen EU’s excellence and attractiveness in research and innovation 
• strengthen EU’s economic and industrial competitiveness 
• support EU’s external policies 
• with international collaborators jointly address global societal challenges. 
 
2.2 Strategic Approach for international cooperation 
One of the main objectives during the workshop was to discuss how to move from a more 
tactical based approach (bi-lateral) towards a more strategic approach (multi-lateral 
approach) as seen in figures 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Tactical (bi-lateral) approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Strategic (multi-lateral) approach 
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In order to examine this challenge, the workshop brought together a majority of the projects 
engaged in international cooperation with long standing expertise in both bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral international cooperation (working with governments and/or specific agencies) 
to enable the following outcomes: 
1. discuss their experiences and insights in order to brainstorm a strategy to move 
forward on international cooperation in future calls for collaborative research; 
2. Forming the current bi-lateral (and potentially overlapping) country to country 
cooperation into a comprehensive and coordinated global cooperation. 
In addition to BIC, a wealth of experiences was represented from the following international 
cooperation projects: IST Africa, EuroAfrica-P8, FEED, AUS-ACCESS4EU, PACE-Net, EU 
– India Spirit, Synchroniser, Euro-IndiaGrid2, OpenChina-ICT, FIRST, FORESTA, PAERIP, 
SEACOOP, EuroAfrica-P8, IST-EC2 (EU funded FP6 project to foster research in ICT 
between Europe & Canada), and AMERICAS.  
These projects gave their insights on their experiences and suggestions for improvement 
and the main point was agreement that it is a very good idea to move towards a more multi-
lateral strategic position. However, in the discussions, it wasn’t very clear how this strategy 
shift could occur within the current mechanisms that focus bi-laterally on seven (7) distinct 
regions. While this regional approach may work for higher level themes, the main difficulty 
arises when a particular research topic, for example, cyber security, needs to be addressed 
globally and multi-laterally amongst many regions and the bi-lateral approach is not suited 
for this type of longer term strategic activity.  
In order to address this, in the BIC project through the interactions with the International 
Advisory Group (IAG) and Working groups (WGs), they are trying to capture a more 
strategic approach and this was presented at the workshop and is summarized in the next 
sections.  
2.3 Key elements for International Cooperation 
The terms of reference of BIC Working Groups specify that WG3, (Programme/funding and 
focus/identify community,) will focus on a multi-disciplinary approach towards establishing 
international cooperation between all stakeholders.  
Having recognized the importance and relevance of International Cooperation to 
addressing the critical issue of ICT Trust & Security, it is essential to appreciate that the 
organisation of this level of cooperation needs special treatment to identify and define 
objectives and manage their execution to achieve the intended results.  
A number of key elements are essential to be considered from the outset to establish the 
objectives and manage cooperation, duly taking into consideration the challenges. 
In this context, it is appropriate to note UN Resolution 57/239. Creation of a global culture 
of cyber security, attached as Annex 1 to this report. 
The participants agreed that in order to reach the stage of mutually beneficial international 
collaborative research projects, the stakeholders must systematically go through a number 
of contributory phases:   
1. setting the strategy and designing the framework processes;  
2. establishing the framework – both the procedural and technical aspect. this requires 
close cooperation with the funding bodies; 
3. setting up collaborations and projects within the framework; 
4. carrying out the joint research and development work. 
This process is not intended be overly rigid: it is recognised there must be overlaps and 
potential of activities out-of-sequence, e.g, BIC may be seen as preceding any agreed 
framework, and is thus part of phase (1). The necessary strategy for the successful set-up 
of a framework for international cooperation calls for consideration of the inevitable 
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complexities and multiple dimensions involved.  The following (non-exclusive) key elements 
need to be addressed for projects 3  (including projects related to the development of 
strategies for international cooperation e.g. BIC, AMERICAS, IST Africa, …) that are going 
to contribute to international cooperation.   
1. Inclusive & All Pervasive approach with a focus on excellence should be an essential 
theme for building up the right team(s) and the scope of project(s) and participants.  
2. Clear Scope of Work (SOW). Defining the SOW with clarity is the next essential part 
for smooth progress of work and avoiding any ambiguity at a later date. 
3. Appropriate Management Structure commensurate with the SOW and deliverables 
with unambiguously defined hierarchy of role and responsibilities is another key element 
to help ensuring effective management. 
4. Focus: Projects of such diverse dimensions are prone to getting diverted from the 
original path / objective. Caution against such pitfalls and constant reviews are essential 
to stay focussed. 
5. Vision, Mission & Targets: A management approach with well defined vision, mission 
& targets is essential.  While the project objectives should have a vision beyond an 
estimated period of time say five years, there has to be mission oriented approach for 
achievements in medium length of time, say 3-5 years. At the same time, the progress 
of the project must also define short term action plans and targets that must be 
achieved within the time blocks of 3 months, 6 months and one year. 
6. Project Management: The project would also need to follow established principles of 
project management with special emphasis on following aspects: 
a. Planning of resources, costs and time (time lines & mile stones) and a clear roll out 
plan. 
b. A suitable monitoring mechanism associated with regular review of processes, 
people and benchmarks. 
c. Provision for Course Corrections of the project activities may also be required at 
times after the reviews. 
7. Long Term Strategy: The current and emerging threats to trust & security are an 
ongoing challenge, with constant possibilities of new types of threats coming up with 
time; the project needs to have long term strategy and provision for collaboration with 
future projects.  
a. Metrics: It would also be essential to measure the progress in concrete terms and; 
suitable metrics are essential to assess the state of the project at any point of time. 
More discussion on metrics, or indicators, for success is given in section 2.5 below.   
b. Project roadmap: The nature of international strategy development projects like 
BIC and others would not allow the classical approach to define the roadmap right in 
the beginning. A flexible approach with regular reviews at some defined milestones 
would be more appropriate to maintain a meaningful direction.  
c. Successful outcome: A good project needs to strive for a successful outcome in 
line with the defined deliverables. Metrics for goal setting & achievement for 
assessing proper implementation and provisions for carrying forward to a next 
stage, if applicable, providing for such continuity for a project to smoothly roll on to a 
subsequent stage are essential elements for the concluding phase. However, it was 
                                               
 
3  A ‘project’ can cover any funded group collaborative activity in any of the above four phases, not 
just the productive, phase (4) elements 
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noted at the workshop that the mechanisms available in the Framework 
Programmes don’t always enable this to happen as there might be a shift in the 
priorities of the call text and resulting evaluation interpretations and focus leaving 
the project participants in a difficult situation to have any level of continuum. 
8. Funding: YES – absolutely! – but, planning and building a strategy for long term 
international participation involves ongoing work by individuals and bodies from different 
countries, and organisations with diverse backgrounds. ‘Voluntary’ participation is often 
needed and relied upon, particularly in the early days and between phases; this is 
based mainly more on a personal basis than on the involvement of a particular project 
(probably non-existent anyway: projects come and go; the people and their know-how 
stick around). However, for this sort of arrangement to work, there needs to be some 
longer-term support-funding available to cover necessary associated costs – travel, 
coordination, central administration, secretariat, venues, etc.  It is recommended that 
the IAG, in particular the programme management members, explore the options and 
possibilities for establishing such support; a sort of ‘trust fund4’, and/or, perhaps set of 
interconnected ‘trust funds’ to be used if and when required. 
2.4 Stakeholders, Mechanisms & Frameworks  
The BIC Project has two main stakeholders: 
1. Researchers in both academic and industrial capacities: these are the specialists in 
the field, expected to explore various options, carry out necessary research and 
technological developments for the proposed solutions. The role of the industry will 
be to develop the products and solutions based on the designs provided by the 
researchers and take the developed products and solutions to the market, to the 
users.   
2. Programme Management: These are the government bodies related to the area of 
research that are engaged in the facilitation of the mechanisms and frameworks for 
funding. They are involved in the examination and evaluation of the proposals, 
allocation of the funds, and formulating the process of regulating the required funds 
and disburse the same in accordance with the defined process.  
2.4.1 Europe 
Within Europe, the European Commission’s Framework programme 7 (FP7) has supported 
international cooperation, including within areas related to trust and security research, in a 
number of different ways.  
The first is a ‘general opening’, where international partners are welcome to participate in 
all Challenges and Objectives with the following eligibility criteria:  
• Minimum 3 different EU Member States or Associated Countries 
• Beyond this minimum, all non-EU/non-AC countries can participate 
The second is a ‘targeted opening’, where the participation of third countries is particularly 
encouraged. The targeted openings are explicitly mentioned in some of the Objectives (e.g. 
Australia, South Korea under WP2013). 
The third is part of ‘Horizontal Actions’ including bi-lateral coordinated calls. Some 
examples include the coordinated calls with Brazil and Japan (under WP2013) and 
international partnership building and support to dialogues (Objective 10.3 under WP2013). 
A number of targeted openings in WP2013 were highlighted during the workshop including:  
                                               
 
4 a government fund administered separately from other funds and used for a specified purpose. 
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1. Objective ICT-2013.1.5 Trustworthy ICT: EU-Australia cooperation on building user 
trust in broadband delivered services 
• Demonstrate in a real-life environment the maturity and practicality of a digital 
authentication framework in broadband delivered services working across several 
jurisdictions (organisational, governmental) with high levels of assurance.  
• Funding: up to €3 million 
2. Objective ICT-2013.1.7 Future Internet Research Experimentation (FIRE): 
• EU-South Africa cooperation on future internet experimental research and test-
bed interconnection 
• EU-China cooperation on future internet experimental research and IPv6 
• EU-South Korea cooperation on future internet experimental research 
3. Objective ICT-2013.2.2 Robotics Use Cases and Accompanying Measures: 
• Robotics networking - help identify new users and markets and new research 
areas through sector-based analysis; establish a strategy towards sustainable 
international cooperation in robotics, focussing initially on the United States. 
A number of coordinated calls available in WP2013 were highlighted.  
1. ICT-2013-10.1-EU-Japan Research and Development Cooperation. A number of 
important events have taken place between the European Commission and EU 
research communities with Japan (MIC/NICT) over the last few years in the “Future 
Internet” domain. This work has led to the organisation of an EU-Japan coordinated 
call that is part of the research Work Programme 2013.  
The topics for consideration include: 
a) Optical communications 
b) Wireless communications 
c) Cybersecurity for improved resilience against cyber threats 
d) Extending the cloud paradigm to the Internet of Things – Connected object and 
sensor clouds within the service perspective 
e) Federation of test-beds: control, tools and experiments 
f) Green and content centric networks 
The funding scheme for the coordinated call with EU- Japan is Small or medium scale 
focused research projects (STREPs) with an indicative budget of EUR 9 million (a similar 
budget for the call is expected from the Japanese MIC and NICT). The timing for the call is 
2 Oct – 29 Nov 2012.  
The whole work programme is subject of an information day in Warsaw, Poland on 26 and 
27 September 2012. See information at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/ictproposersday/2012/index_en.htm.  
In addition, concerning the EU-Japan R&D activity, a dedicated page has been opened 
where you can submit your ideas, partner search, and take this opportunity to be part of the 
EU-Japan networking session that takes place on 27 September 2012. You will find the 
relevant additional information at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/cf/ictpd12/item-display.cfm?id=8435 
2. ICT-2013.10.2 EU-Brazil Research and Development Cooperation. The topics for 
consideration include: 
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a) Cloud computing for Science 
b) Sustainable technologies for a Smarter Society 
c) Smart Services and applications for a Smarter Society   
d) Hybrid broadcast-broadband TV applications and services 
The funding scheme for the coordinated call with EU - Brazil is Small or medium scale 
focused research projects (STREPs) with an indicative budget of EUR 5 million (a similar 
budget for the call is expected from the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Innovation (MCTI). The timing for the call is 10 Jul – 24 Oct 2012. 
The Horizontal International cooperation actions available in WP2013 include Objective 
ICT-2013.10.3 International Partnership Building and Support to Dialogues, where the goal 
is to support dialogues between the European Commission/the EU and strategic partner 
countries and regions, and to foster cooperation with strategic third country organisations in 
collaborative ICT RTD both within the EU's Framework Programmes (FP7, Horizon 2020) 
and under relevant third country programmes. The Targeted countries/regions include: 
a) ACP countries (in particular Africa) 
b) Asia (in particular China, India, South-East Asia) 
c) Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
d) High Income Countries: Subgroup 1:  North America (Canada, USA) 
e) High Income Countries: Subgroup 2: East Asia/Oceania (Australia, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan) 
f) Latin America 
g) Mediterranean Partner Countries 
It is expected that each targeted area will be covered by at least one project, and that 
duplication of effort in an area is avoided. The Funding scheme/expected budget is 
Coordination and Support Action (CSA) (SA) with €8 million (maximum EU grant of EUR 
800 K per proposal). The date of publication of Call 10 is 10/07/2012, call deadline: 
15/01/2013. 
A brief overview of international cooperation in Horizon 2020 (H2020) was given: 
• International cooperation will be a cross-cutting issue in H2020; 
• The approach will be similar to the current practice and may include a general 
opening of the programme, targeted openings, horizontal actions on international 
cooperation and coordinated calls; 
• Collaborative actions with specific third countries or their groups will be 
implemented on the basis of common interest and mutual benefit; 
• Reciprocal access to third country programmes will be encouraged; 
• Changes will be made to the ICPC list, or its concept as such potentially excluding 
certain middle-income countries (e.g. BRICs) from that list. This will be specified at 
the WP level; 
• A Commission Communication is scheduled to be adopted in Sept 2012, which will 
provide further detail on how the principles outlined above will be applied across 
H2020. 
In operational terms, the European Commission's Directorate General (DG) Information 
Society and Media (DG-INFSO), through its "Trust and Security" unit F5, through which the 
BIC project is funded, has been entrusted with supporting and coordinating research across 
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the continent and through international cooperation in the areas of trust and security. As of 
1st July 2012, a few days after the BIC workshop, DG-INFSO is becoming DG CONNECT 
(Communications Networks, Content and Technology) and the impact on the Trust and 
Security unit was explained to the BIC workshop participants.  
The trust and security unit leaves the former INFSO Directorate F "Emerging Technologies 
and Infrastructures" and becomes a part of CONNECT Directorate H "Sustainable and 
Secure Society". Directorate's H’s main goals are to address selected ICT challenges for a 
sustainable, healthy and secure society, and to develop a full-cycle roadmap to get the 
output into the EU economy, through innovation tools such as pilot-lines, pre-commercial 
procurement, and standards. Directorate H is the leader for Horizon 2020/Societal 
Challenges. 
The Trust & Security (H.4) priorities are the following: 
• Elaborate a European strategy on Internet security and remove Cyber security 
related obstacles to the proper functioning of the Internal Market. 
• We will manage implementation of the e-privacy Directive and follow-up of all issues 
related to the protection of privacy on-line. 
• Manage the various financial programmes (FP7, CIP, H2020) supporting the 
Internet and ICT security. 
•  Promote a better coordinated and coherent approach on cyber incident 
management worldwide. 
To find out more information about the transition to DG CONNECT, please visit 
 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/information_society/connect_en.htm 
2.4.2 Brazil 
The Brazil funding agencies for ICT, including trust and security related research were 
presented during the workshop. These include:  
• CNPq (National Research Council) and FINEP (financiadora de estudos e projetos) 
have public calls for funding. These are national foundations linked to the Ministry of 
Science and Technology. More information at http://www.cnpq.br/english/cnpq/index.htm 
and http://www.finep.gov.br/english/FINEP_folder_ingles.pdf. 
• CTIC is the Research and Development Centre for ICT of the  Ministry of Science and 
Technology. They are an alternative to CNPQ but with focus in ICT. Currently they 
have several funding lines, one in DigitalTV, another in Cloud Computing, another in 
Smart Cities and another in Network Virtualization. Website can be found at 
http://www.ctic.rnp.br/. 
• FUNTEL, which is a fund for technological development of Telecommunications. 
FUNTEL is linked to the Ministry of Communications of Brazil. 
http://www.funtel.com.br 
• State Research Foundations - Each State has its own foundation with its own budget 
and they have freedom to establish their own calls, but it is not only specific to ICT. 
As an example of a successful international targeted call involving a security element, the 
recent Brazil – EU call was highlighted. In September 2010, the CNPq of Brazil and DG 
INFSO of the European Commission launched a coordinated call for bi-national projects in 
ICT with the total amount of R$ 11million/ 5 million Euro, with up to R$ 3 million/1.5 million 
Euro per project. Five areas were included in the call (Edital CNPq No. 066/2010): Future 
Internet - Experimental Facilities, Future Internet – Security, Networked Systems and 
Control, e-Infrastructures and Microelectronics/Microsystems. But only one project per area 
were able to receive the budget. 
As a result to this call, a range of research groups in Brazil and EU had the common 
objective to promote interaction and cooperation, but for many research groups in Brazil it 
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was the first experience of preparing a project proposal with FP7 requirements and format. 
Nevertheless, several consortiums were formed, but not so many achieved the coordinated 
project submission. 
Lessons have been learned with the coordinated project submissions, mainly considering 
that the coordinated call is fundamental to have a formal means to promote cooperation 
between researchers from European and Brazilian communities. More specific calls to 
Future Internet and related topics would stimulate more projects, and encourage 
consortiums to improve the quality and experience of the partners. 
As mentioned above, within WP2013, there is another ICT-2013.10.2 EU-Brazil Research 
and Development Cooperation. The topics for consideration include: 
a) Cloud computing for Science 
b) Sustainable technologies for a Smarter Society 
c) Smart Services and applications for a Smarter Society   
d) Hybrid broadcast-broadband TV applications and services. 
2.4.3 South Africa 
The key funding bodies/programmes in South Africa are the following: 
1. Dept of Science and Technology (DST) – http://www.dst.gov.za engages in mostly 
institutional funding eg to science councils like the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) http://www.csir.co.za/, space agency, and large science initiatives 
like Square Kilometer Array. 
2. DST - EU-South Africa Science and Technology Advancement Programme 
(ESASTAP) (http://www.esastap.org.za), which provides seed funding for proposals, 
National Contact Point funding, co-funding of FP7 projects and COST travel funding.) 
3. DST - Technology Innovation Agency - http://www.tia.org.za provides funding for 
development and commercialisation.  
4. NRF, National Research Foundation - http://www.nrf.ac.za provides funding for 
schools, university research, research chairs, furthering education, and international 
bilateral S&T programmes. 
5. NRF - THRIP = Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme in 
collaboration with Dept Trade & Industry, http://thrip.nrf.ac.za provides funding for 
industry based programmes. 
6. SPII - support programme for industrial innovation (Dept of Trade & Industry) - 
www.spii.co.za  
7. eSkills Institute as part of the Dept of Communications -http://www.doc.gov.za provides 
internal funding for eLearning and eSkills programmes. 
2.4.4 India 
The main funding agency responsible for funding Research and Technological 
Development (RTD) in India is the Department of Information Technology (DIT), which falls 
within the Ministry of Communications & Information Technology of the Government of 
India. The units in DIT dealing with all areas of ICT trust and security are described below.  
The Cyber Laws & eSecurity Group, as shown in Figure 3, contains a number of different 
programmes:  
• Cyber Security strategy [1] - A cyber security strategy has been outlined by DIT to 
address the strategic objectives for securing country's cyber space and is being 
implemented through the following major initiatives: Security Policy, Compliance 
and Assurance; Security Incident Early Warning & Response; Security training 
skills/competence development & user end awareness; Security RTD for Securing 
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the Infrastructure, meeting the domain specific needs and enabling technologies; 
and Security Promotion & Publicity. 
• Cyber Laws strategy [2] - Provides legal recognition to electronic documents and a 
framework to support e-filing and e-commerce transactions and also provides a 
legal framework to mitigate, check cyber crimes.  
• Cyber Security R&D strategy [3] – promotes research & development activities 
through grant-in-aid support to recognized autonomous R&D organizations and 
academic institutions proposing to undertake time-bound projects in the thrust areas 
identified. 
The closest to Unit H.4 Trust and Security within DG-CONNECT of the European 
Commission [17] would be a combination between the Cyber Security strategy and Cyber 
Security R&D groups, probably more so towards the latter. The DIT mainly funds research 
and academic institutions. There are other programmes that may also touch upon some of 
the other topic areas covered in the EU including one dealing with judicial matters in 
relation to Cyber space, the Cyber Appellate Tribunal (CAT[4]); Indian Computer 
Emergency Response Team (ICERT[5]), the nation's referral agency of the Indian 
Community for responding to computer security incidents as and when they occur; and 
Controller Of Certifying Authorities (CCA[6]), provided for by the Information Technology 
Act, 2000 [7] as the governing authority which licenses and regulates the workings of 
Certifying Authorities [8], who issue digital signature certificates for electronic authentication 
of users.   
 
 
Figure 3. DIT Groups and their respective Heads/Group coordinators [4] 
With regards to International cooperation and how it links to Trust and Security, there is an 
International cooperation Directorate that works very closely with the Directorate under 
which the Cyber Security and eSecurity group belong. There are a number of departments 
related to international cooperation and the most appropriate one for Trust and security 
research would be the Department of International Cooperation & Industrial Promotion, 
Bilateral Trade Division [9]. There are already a number of FP7 projects engaged in EU – 
India cooperation (e.g. ERNET India connectivity with European Research Network – 
GEANT) and these are detailed at [9]. 
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How funding or R&D projects in Cyber Security Works 
Department of Information Technology (DIT) invites R&D project proposals in Cyber 
Security area. Cyber Security R&D initiative of DIT in an open call fashion that is aimed at 
promotion of basic research, technology demonstration, proof-of-concept along with 
indigenous development of technology in the area of Cyber Security [10].   
The Cyber Security Programme also includes establishment of test bed projects for 
enhancing indigenous skills and capabilities.  
As detailed above, the thrust areas of research and development identified include (a) 
Cryptography and cryptanalysis, (b) Network and systems security, (c) Security 
architectures, (d) Vulnerability and assurance and (e) Monitoring, surveillance and forensics.  
R&D proposals are invited from autonomous academic and R&D organizations in the 
following specific areas:  (i) Mobile Security, (ii) Malware detection and analysis, (iii) 
Network and  system security assurance, (iv) Cryptography and cryptanalysis, (v) 
Monitoring tools for network and system security, (vi) Enterprise forensics and (vii) Mobile 
forensics.  
The proposals may be single or multi-institutional, with clearly defined milestones/timelines 
and role of individual institution. Project proposals duly endorsed by the institution (in 25 
copies in prescribed format enclosed) may be sent to Member Secretary, Working Group, 
E-Security Division, Department of Information Technology, Electronics Niketan, 6 CGO 
Complex, Lodi Road, New Delhi -110003. 
2.5 Success metrics / Impact evaluation 
There were very interesting discussions on the identification of “success metrics” for 
international cooperation and collaboration and an agreed approach to come up with 
measures for success for this. Some noteworthy comments made during the presentations 
regarding success metrics were the following: 
• It is difficult to predict the future; research on several topics is just a way to be 
prepared for the unknown future;  
• ‘Things happen’ as a result of our activities but it isn’t always clearly identified as a 
direct result;  
• Measures for success should include rationale – motives and goals – for active 
engagement in international cooperation;  
• Although difficult, as a working group already engaged in these activities, we could 
try to draw up some success criteria regard to results and monitoring;  
• It would be useful for us as a community to agree on ways to carry out analysis and 
assessment of INCO impact. 
During the discussions, a number of points were discussed and agreed by the participants: 
• Setting up multi-lateral international cooperation is not an easy endeavour as the 
countries all have different ways and mechanisms for carrying out Research and 
Technological Development (RTD) management, funding, plans and implementations, 
which are inherently difficult to set up (vision, interests, meetings, agendas). 
Furthermore, it takes a considerable amount of time, effort and patience to set up 
fruitful examples of INCO on a bi-lateral basis and even more complications on a 
multi-lateral basis. Therefore, the establishment of success metrics and measures will 
subsequently be as difficult with all of the factors involved. A clear example of this 
could be success could be garnered in one country but would then be classified as a 
failure if another country couldn’t stand up to their side of the agreement due to some 
unforeseen reason. 
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• There were a number of ways to cooperate on an international basis. There could be 
a focus on Research / Dissemination & Exploitation activities (Academic interest/ 
industry). This is made complicated because some countries only focus on academic 
and research institutes whereas others have a stronger focus on industry funding; 
local/regional topics vs global cooperation topics in which there are calls open for 
specific topics, sometimes cooperation is needed for other topics not in open EU calls, 
which makes it very frustrating for the research communities. There is a need for 
more cooperation at the government and policy levels and not only at the research 
levels.  
• How to measure the impact of INCO? The success metrics should be broken down at 
the various levels, e.g.  
o Market: business done, what has been exploited/how, number of companies 
created, new research plans, etc. 
o Knowledge gained: specifications, new standards, new technologies; 
o Regulation, Policy: exp. new directives for Europe 
• When thinking about metrics, would INCO for Security, Trust & Privacy RTD have 
special or different properties or considerations that make INCO  
(a) more important? 
(b) more difficult? 
• We must think at a global level as there are key questions and there are notions 
related to security, trust and privacy have different meanings in the EU (South/North) 
as well as in third countries e.g. India/ Japan / China (with regard to cultural aspects). 
Scalability is also very important (e.g. China, India: >1 billion people for ID card) and 
cultural aspects e.g. the take up of biometrics where photography is involved. 
• For topics like identity management, the research communities need to be talking at 
an international level: necessary to understand what identity means in Japan, China, 
India, etc… A similar argument has to be made for dealing with cyber attacks / 
hackers have different behaviours depending upon geography, legislation and culture. 
It must be taken account that some security topics cannot be shared easily e.g. 
geostrategic, exchange of data, and ways of incentivising this must be discussed. 
• We need to determine how success can be measured in terms of contributions to 
multi-disciplinary research and technological development. What are the specific S&T 
issues and RTD challenges that must be addressed in a global context. A measure of 
success depends on a number of influential factors, including where the starting point 
is (whether a new collaboration or a more mature collaboration of long standing and 
the audience, whether they be the European Commission, the research communities, 
industry members, or other parties willing to engage in international cooperation. 
• There is a tendency for people to only pay attention to the entities e.g. projects, 
initiatives, platforms, … that bring in the ‘big bucks’. However, there could be some 
unsung heroes involved in these awards who don’t get the recognition. Therefore, 
there is a need to have qualitative as well as quantitative evidence included in our 
measures of success. 
• What should projects like ours measure? If you want to measure your results, 
outputs, deliverables, contacts made, … on a range from 1 to 10 grid, then you want 
to know about each of these items for the kinds of collaborations and influencing 
factors as mentioned above (maturity level and audience). How to characterise the 
things to measure is not altogether clear. It was suggested that a questionnaire could 
be sent to all the projects to try to identify the measurement items with weighting for 
each. It is difficult to measure the kinds of things being asked for as it is difficult to 
predict the future and ‘things happen’ as a result of our activities but it isn’t always 
clearly identified as a direct result. A number of cases were discussed during the 
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workshop where project participants learned of new projects spawned as a result of 
their projects many years afterwards. 
• How do we measure non-scientific aspects (the ability to effectively network and 
eventually collaborate) along with more scientific aspects e.g. forming successful 
research proposals that pass the ever lowering barrier of success rates. 
• How / when do you find the actual number of proposals / projects that were put 
together based on your earlier work. It is quite difficult to get all of the information on 
submitted proposals and even if you get these, how do you know they originated from 
your earlier work? 
• We should clarify the purpose of these measurements, whether it be to develop the 
strategy for increased international cooperation or to justify the need for international 
cooperation projects (we believe it is the former mainly and that should be our focus).  
• Is there a way to measure the change in number of non EU partners over time 
(numerator)?  
• Measures of success should incorporate the rationale – motives and goals – for 
engagement in international cooperation, success criteria with regard to results and 
monitoring; and, finally, analysis and assessment of INCO impact. 
• Would there be a way to calculate the amount of money that could be saved by 
engaging in international cooperation. For each topic area, are there any measures 
that could be realised e.g. it was suggested a good example could be international 
cyber security research, which could save the countries xyz euros if done together? Is 
it possible to put a number on how much is saved by involvement of international 
partners? 
• Is there a way of distinguishing what makes sense of doing it alone in the EU and 
what makes sense carrying out on an international scale? Can we find out definitively 
which makes more sense? It depends on the research topic is and what resources 
are required for the research. Although we all believe it is important, due to many of 
the points raised above, it is difficult to quantify the benefit of international 
cooperation. We should work on this together to at least try and find this out in the 
future. 
• Do we start by measuring the past? Or just start in the future? Do we start measuring 
new international cooperation beneficiaries. Also, should we measure the number of 
beneficiaries with whom you consult but then don’t achieve success due to other 
factors outside your control? E.g. no interest in collaboration or funding isn’t an issue 
in their own countries. 
• Is it possible for us to measure Return on Investment (ROI)? In order to do this, we 
would need to measure utilization with some degree of precision. Although it is 
important to monitor where the money is being spent, you really want to measure 
increased productivity and effectiveness, but let’s set that as an aspirational goal. 
During the workshop, we tried to capture a number of stories anecdotally about how 
consortia where formed (examples in EU-Africa, EU-India, EU-Australia, EU-United 
States). 
• How would we go about calculating ROI from international community involvement 
(e.g., in FP7 and H2020)? Can we each contribute to how we could agree to quantify 
the benefit of international community involvement. A suggestion was made to create 
a success metrics survey to ask some of these questions. 
• Perhaps measure the amount of collaboration with academic and industry in a region 
and try to quantify the role this has in sparking innovation and as serving as a catalyst 
within private industry, including the potential for a number of start-ups. 
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• We spoke about extended working groups and outreach to other interested parties. Is 
there a way to measure the success of these undertakings (no. of meetings held, 
topics/themes generated, visitations made, awareness, training and teaching courses 
held, consortia being formed, …?). However, we should not be placed in a position to 
measure items that will deliberately make our cooperation(s) look bad. In other words, 
it’s a useful measure if you’re trying to improve the community building mechanisms 
and not to destroy them. 
• Is there a way to measure retention rate–how many of the community remain over a 
particular period as opposed to transient members who get involved once or twice. 
However, we must be careful that we don’t categorise transient participants who use 
the resources for a short time in a way to count them as failures. There could be 
mitigating circumstances where their research was carried out successfully and there 
was no further need to collaborate. This should, therefore, be classed as a success.  
• Is there a way to measure excellence in an impartial way? In other words, how can 
actions that are supposed to be impartial separate excellence from mediocrity if 
encountered in the process?  
• A participant (from India) suggested a tool could be customised for indicating metrics 
for success of international cooperation. This would be taken up following the 
workshop as the first step would be to get the participants to highlight the measures 
for success and give them appropriate weights. The tool could then be designed 
according to these.  
• We should examine why some countries seem to have more of a success rate e.g. 
Australia and New Zealand. Could it be true that it was because they did/didn’t need 
the resources.  
• Reference to the ongoing tools, based on technology platforms should be included, 
as they are mechanisms to foster the networking and cooperation between high level 
researchers and international partners are invited to join. The success case of the 
technology platforms as built for some Latin American countries represent a valid 
reference for other actions with other regions. 
2.6 The Way Forward 
A significant amount of work and research studies in the areas of ICT “Trust & Security” are 
already going on across different parts of the world. Many individuals and organizations – 
research institutes and industry – within projects are busy doing work independently. 
Unfortunately, most of the work is happening in isolation, in a disjointed manner with no 
systematic coordination and cooperation amongst each other. They are only accessing 
each other through open access methods of published papers, journals etc. Therefore, 
there is strong need to create a platform and associated mechanisms such as that offered 
by BIC, which can bring all such work together in such a fashion that there is systematic 
and regular information exchange and mutual support. This cooperation platform would 
facilitates the work to become better-coordinated and consolidated such that combined and 
consolidated work is very comprehensive and becomes a formidable defence against the 
regular emerging threats to our digital lives across the globe and also ensures that 
duplication of work is minimized. 
Structured Multi-Lateral Approach 
At present, the International Advisory Group (IAG) formed under BIC, is there to suggest 
and formulate the policies, processes and mechanisms to achieve international cooperation 
in the area of the ICT Trust and Security community. Three independent working groups, 
WG1, WG2 & WG3 with specific objectives as defined in the BIC WG Terms of Reference 
[11], have been formed comprising specialists from different countries and different 
specializations. Indeed, these WGs form the backbone of the Project; however, they alone 
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would not be enough to take the entire project forward to its logical conclusion. They would, 
therefore, need to be supported by additional Groups and Sub-Groups in a structured 
manner, at the management and functional level with defined focus area, roles and 
responsibilities. 
Since the nature of the project requires interactions amongst all participant countries to 
share the information, resources etc, the approach for the formal interactions, flow of 
information and smoothness of actions, it becomes natural that the groups and sub groups 
working for the project work closely with each other. Accordingly at international 
management level, it requires a change in approach from the existing bi-lateral approach 
i.e. EU-India, EU- Brazil, EU- SA, … to multi-lateral approach where each participating 
country develops a formal system for direct multi-lateral communication and interacts with 
each other besides interacting centrally as well. Of course, the existence and role of a 
central body is essential for ensuring that the focus of the projects are not digressed and 
there is proper coordination amongst all adhering to the core principles and objectives of 
the project. 
A possible multi-lateral structure is outlined below, with an extended proposed structure in 
Annex 2. 
a. Core Working Group (CWG); based on the current BIC IAG and supporting WGs as 
shown in Figure 4.  
b. Extended Working Groups (EWGs) – specific for each participating country as 
shown in Figure 5. 
c. Special Function Groups – operating under EWGs as specialists at functional level. 
Note: This is only an initial proposed structure and will be discussed in more details as part 
of the Working Group 3 and the International Advisory Group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Overall structure of BIC project and external bodies 
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 19 of 65 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Basic structure of IAG including Core Working Groups and External Working Groups and SFGs 
 
3. Break out session Work Group reports 
3.1 WG1. Human oriented/citizen approaches for trust, privacy and security  
3.1.1 Chair/Rapporteur Introduction 
Authors: Fernando Kraus Sanchez, Henning Arendt, Mounib Mekhilef and contributions 
from animators. 
After welcoming all participants, a brief introduction highlighting the multiple dimensions of 
trust, privacy and security and the difficulties to grasp all their implications far beyond from 
pure technological standpoint, opened straight into the presentations, which are 
summarised below. 
3.1.2 User centricity 
Animator(s): Karima Boudaoud, I3S Laboratory - University of Nice Sophia Antipolis/CNRS, 
France and Mounib Mekhilef, Ability Europe Ltd., France 
User centricity for trust, privacy and security (TPS) means designing security solutions that 
are oriented towards the users. Nowadays, we cannot ignore the fact that in order to 
improve the use of security and strengthen it, we need to involve the point of view of the 
end-users to take into account the real needs of the citizens and stop designing security 
solutions from the point of view of security experts only. Consequently, designing user 
centric TPS solutions implies considering the: different kinds of users, different generations 
of users, different cultures and different societal values. Taking into account the Human 
aspect is not enough we need also to design TPS solutions that are compliant with the law 
of the country where the TPS solutions will be deployed (for example in Europe, solutions 
will have to be compliant with the EU Data protection regulation).  
To move towards a user-centric approach, we need: 
• Strong collaboration between different actors and experts from different disciplines 
(psychologists, sociologists, economists, legal, government, education, ICT and 
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security) to take into account the cultural heritage/history, societal & individual values, 
psychological characteristics, technology, laws and regulations, etc. 
• Creation of Living labs for trust, privacy and security to drive the design and 
development of security solutions. 
• Education of the existing users and preparation of the next generation of users to 
raise awareness regarding trust, privacy and security. Education of users requires an 
education program strategy based on shared values: building roadmaps for 
stakeholders in education and curriculum for primary and high schools. 
From an international point of view, different actions are required: 
• Collaboration with: 
– International security experts having a user-centric approach regarding trust, 
privacy and security (Brazil, India, South Africa, Canada, USA, France, etc.)  
– International experts from different disciplines to take into account the differences 
in terms of culture, laws, etc. 
• Collaboration with international standardization organisations such as W3C, ETSI, 
IETF, etc. 
These collaborations can start through:  
• Creation of multidisciplinary working groups in each targeted country (right experts 
from each discipline). 
• Organization of international multidisciplinary workshops in targeted countries 
(involving wider public). 
In conclusion, the Human-oriented/citizen approaches for trust, privacy and security WG 
must allow actions to finally start changing the way in designing security solutions in order 
to move towards a more effective user centric approach for Trust, Privacy and Security. 
3.1.3 Privacy and Data protection 
Animator(s): Alan Hartman, IBM, Israel and Claudia Diaz, COSIC, KU Leuven 
The notion of privacy is changing, and there are active campaigns to promote the thesis 
that “Privacy is dead – get used to it” as stated by several leading American academics and 
business people. The rise of social networking online means that people no longer have an 
expectation of privacy, according to Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg. (guardian.co.uk) 
An experiment conducted by Steve Rambam reveals the extent of data available on the 
internet concerning most US citizens. The situation in Europe is relatively better, since 
privacy laws are stricter and more strictly enforced. The „Privacy is dead“ thesis is actively 
being promoted by the marketing industry and social networking sites, since the sale of 
data, which in Europe is private, is an increasingly profitable industry (see the recent New 
York Times article on the Acxiom corporation). 
The questions that need to be discussed in order to stop the erosion of privacy are:  
• Who is responsible for the preservation of an individual’s privacy? Is it the 
government? The corporations? Or the responsibility of the individual? 
• How can we as a research community empower the individual to take control of his or 
her own private data?  
• What new powers are needed by the governments to restrain the „privacy violation 
industries“?  
• How can corporations be convinced of the added value provided by privacy 
preserving services (see the ENISA report on the Monetization of Privacy)? 
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International cooperation projects are necessary to tackle these questions for several 
reasons. The foremost of these challenges to address being the trans-national nature of 
most information available on the internet, the different legal frameworks in a variety of 
countries, and the social variability between individuals in different regions of the world. 
(See the BIC presentation by Marijke Coetzee of University of Johannesburg on the 
different social norms in emerging markets – section 3.1.7). 
The types of international based socio-technical projects necessary are the following: 
• For the individual: A comprehensive, easy to use, privacy enhancing technology, that 
takes into account the “do not track”, “do not link”, and “minimize data exposure” 
principles. Some of these technologies already exist, but none are widely available in 
a single package, that can be tuned to individual preferences, and used unobtrusively 
whenever the individual engages in online activity. 
• For corporations: A set of tools and an extensible framework for the conduct of 
privacy audits. Currently privacy audits are conducted manually using highly skilled 
personnel – and are prohibitively expensive for small enterprises. It should be 
possible to create tools to analyze web-sites, data-stores, and other corporate 
activities using a framework with plugins for the different legal frameworks under 
which the audit is being conducted. 
• For governments: A privacy policing toolbox for the detection of privacy law breaches, 
and the gathering of evidence for privacy violation prosecution. This could also be a 
by-product of the previous bullet. 
In conclusion, further international projects in the area of privacy education should also be 
promoted, including instruction on the use of privacy enhancing technologies, and on the 
protection of children and other vulnerable groups. 
Important note: The Annual Privacy Forum 2012 (APF’2012) is being held on the 10th and 
11th of October 2012 in Cyprus. The forum is being organised by ENISA in collaboration 
with DG CONNECT, University of Cyprus and Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the EU. 
The provisional programme is available on the website http://privacyforum.eu/programme 
and registration is available at http://privacyforum.eu/programme/registration. Registration 
is required by the end of September 2012. Additional details can be found in section 5.3. 
3.1.4 Trust management in secure software 
Animator(s): Fabio Martinelli, National Research Council of Italy, Italy 
The scale of the emerging global infrastructure, combined with the need for fully 
autonomous operation, surpass the usefulness of existing security infrastructures such as 
authorization services, certificate issuance and validation services. Having a certified 
identity (maybe granted using sloppy/undocumented procedures) in a dynamic and open 
environment does not a priori guarantee an acceptable behaviour and performance of 
software and services.  
In particular, it is not enough for informed decisions on access restrictions and control, the 
selection among potential candidates for interaction. Entities need to be distinguished not 
only based on their static (certified) identities but also based on their (un)expected, 
dynamically varying qualities that are relevant to the specific interaction context. Decisions 
are often based on directly verifiable evidence, but in a highly open system could be also 
based on indirect evidence reported by other entities. In these cases, the notion of trust 
becomes central.  
Indeed, trust is a very general concept, with different meanings in different communities. 
Usually, trust is declined in several dimensions:  We can trust a system for correctly 
functioning (system trust), we can trust a persona to act in our behalf  (delegation trust), 
etc. In general, we trust something/someone for a purpose in a given context, and such 
interpretation is often used in computer science where several trust management models 
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have been developed (initially for modeling access control issues,  and more recently to 
model relationships in social computing). Indeed, in modern pervasive ICT systems, trust is 
a first-class object that need to be evaluated, analyzed, used, negotiated.  
As mentioned, trust may be based on several features: 
• verifiable evidence: E.g. proof methods, rigorous design & analysis techniques, … 
• direct experience: E.g., previous interaction history (monitoring the target entity 
behaviour is a  main tool …) 
• indirect experience: E.g. third party recommendation (then you need to trust someone 
to recommend others and so on …) 
These must be represented, combined, monitored and negotiated in several ways. Some 
computational models of trusts based have been proposed on social networks, probability 
theory, formal semantics and logic, game theory, etc. 
Trust is also used when we certify software. Basically, we trust a third party to assess 
properties of software installations produced by another party. In addition, trust 
management aspects are necessary in usual Service Level Agreements (SLA) in service 
oriented architectures/infrastructures and in particular for secure service composition.  
Indeed, several stakeholders with different trust levels are involved in a typical service 
composition and a variety of potentially harmful content/service sources. This is attractive in 
terms of degrees of freedom in the creation of service offerings and businesses. Yet this 
also creates more vulnerabilities and risks as the number of trust domains in an application 
gets multiplied, the size of attack surfaces grows and so does the number of threats. 
Furthermore, the Future Internet will be an intrinsically dynamic and evolving paradigm 
where, for instance, end users are more and more empowered and therefore decide (often 
on the spot) on how content and services are shared and composed. This adds an extra 
level of complexity, as both risks and assumptions are hard to anticipate.  
There are several technical areas that need further development in the trustworthy ICT 
research community (in no specific order): 
• Models for trust formation, evolution, delegation, dissolution  
• Social models of trust  
• Trust models for secure software/service composition 
• Certification models for software (producers, vendors, testers, etc.) 
• Integrated assurance/trust techniques  
• Security level prediction of software based on recommendations 
• Trust models for application market 
• Usability of trust and security information/metrics 
• Empirical studies relating trust perception and trustworthiness  
• User perception of software trustworthiness  
• Role of trusted computing for secure software 
• Btw, trusted by whom? 
From an international cooperation perspective, we can highlight:  
• Commonly agreed trust models for service interaction; 
• The standardization of the software and service certification process, including the 
necessary interoperability and automation information; 
• The standardization of Service Level Agreeement (SLA) among services;   
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• From a policy based perspective, there is clearly the need to define certification 
standards to whom high level assurance services need to adhere in several 
scenarios. 
3.1.5 Accountability in Cloud computing 
Animator(s): Nick Papanikolaou – HP Labs Europe, with contributions from Siani Pearson 
and Nick Wainwright of HP Labs Europe  
Introduction 
Cloud computing, which has been enthusiastically received in many of the areas where 
Information Technology (IT) is a dominant factor in day to day life, is the most recent 
manifestation of a long term shift towards the provision of information technologies by 
specialist IT service providers. Whereas previously consumers bought Personal Computers 
(PCs), and businesses had IT departments which owned servers and ran business 
software, future IT needs will be met by infrastructure, platforms and software provided as 
services from the cloud. The cloud, a complex and globally distributed ecosystem of 
networked online services, runs on huge data centres, which store and process vast 
quantities of data gathered from many sources including from the people and business they 
serve, the transactions they process, the environment and many other sources. 
As more aspects of business and personal lives shift into this cyber world of online 
services, concerns have arisen over how we can have confidence that they will protect it 
and handle it responsibly. Data protection regulation aims to address consumer trust and 
the imbalance of power between the individual consumers and these new IT services. 
Businesses using cloud services engage in service level agreements (SLAs) with providers 
which aim to cover (amongst other things) how business data should be handled and what 
it may be used for; however, there are difficulties in ensuring that these address the 
complexities of operating in the complex ecosystem of cloud services. For the cloud service 
provider (CSP), the complexities of compliance with data protection and business 
regulations is a barrier to offering cloud services, and the risks and consequence of non-
compliance are a serious concern. 
Accountability can help us tackle these challenges in trust and complexity. It is especially 
helpful for protecting sensitive or confidential information, enhancing consumer trust, 
clarifying the legal situation in cloud computing, and facilitating cross-border data transfers. 
Accountability provides a way forward in dealing with data-protection issues arising from 
handling personal data in the cloud but these issues transcend personal data handling and 
generalize to other types of data, beyond privacy concerns. 
Accountability is enshrined in regulatory frameworks for data protection across the globe, 
notably the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) privacy 
guidelines (1980), Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(2000) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)’s Privacy Framework (2005). 
Accountability is used here in the sense that the data controller should be accountable for 
complying with that particular data protection legislation. Similarly, EU Directive 95/46/EC 
(1995) contains rudimentary accountability provisions, such as pre-processing regulatory 
notification, information provision requirements and data subject access, but these are ad-
hoc mechanisms, not part of an overarching accountability regime. The resulting 
'accountability gap' is one of the causes of what is conceived as regulatory failure: lack of 
faith in the regulatory framework amongst the general public; the low priority data protection 
compliance receives amongst data controllers including innovation of higher levels of 
privacy protection in new ICTs; and lack of attention for data privacy breaches. 
While all of these regulatory frameworks provide a foundation for data protection, none is 
specifically designed with the cloud computing in mind. What makes data processing in the 
cloud challenging is the scale and complexity of networked cloud services, the pervasive 
role they will play in the future business and personal life, and the ability of advanced data 
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mining techniques to draw inferences about data subjects from the large data sets under 
their control. The “data-centric” nature of cloud computing creates a tension between 
service suppliers who perceive that the business data they hold could be a strategic 
business resource and their customers who are increasingly aware of risks posed by the 
lack of control over data in the cloud. 
Providing Accountability in the Cloud: Approaches and Solutions 
Accountable organisations ensure that obligations to protect data are observed by all who 
store and process the data, irrespective of where that processing occurs. To achieve this 
for the cloud a “chain of accountability” needs to be established that mirrors service user-
provider relationships. Furthermore, it encompasses the complete ecosystem of individual 
and business users, the whole service provider value chain and all aspects of the 
regulatory process, including business governance and audit. 
The individual service user should be able to hold the organisation that is providing them 
with a service accountable for how data is used and handled; this is their primary service 
provider (PSP). The PSP must be able to hold the CSPs that it uses accountable for their 
handling of data as it moves through the supply chain, establishing a chain of accountability 
throughout the supply network. Regulators and the business governance functions of 
organisations using the cloud service must be able to monitor and verify that all parties in 
the supply chain or supply network are operating as accountable organisations. Where data 
includes personal information, the PSP will be the data controller for the purposes of data 
protection and will be accountable to data protection regulators.  
 
Trusted third parties (TTPs) supported by trusted tools and services can provide 
stakeholders with appropriate views of data and how it is used and protected. 
Through contractual agreements, all organizations involved in the cloud provision would be 
accountable. While the PSP, as the first corporate entity in the cloud provision, would be 
held legally accountable, it would then hold the initial service provider accountable through 
contractual agreements, requiring in turn that that SP hold its SPs accountable 
contractually as well.  
To increase trust we must address the needs of all stakeholders – users, providers and 
regulators. Users need a way to understand and make choices about how data may be 
used in the cloud and the consequences and risks associated with those choices. They 
also need to be confident that service providers are treating data appropriately and that 
they can retain control over how it is used, as well as that the legal frameworks are effective 
and that they have ways to hold providers accountable for what happens to that data. 
Service providers need a way to meet customer expectations for greater transparency and 
control, and therefore accountability, over what they do with data – this means technical 
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and legal mechanisms that work together. Further, they need to have confidence that 
providers further down that chain will meet their obligations and responsibilities. Finally 
regulators need to be able to monitor and check compliance and to attribute responsibility 
for any failure. 
Our solution is to address these objectives through an orchestrated set of mechanisms: 
preventive (mitigating risk), detective (monitoring and identifying policy violation) and 
corrective (managing incidents and providing redress), using interdisciplinary co-design to 
ensure that legal and business processes and technical mechanisms work in support of 
each other. The grid in the figure above is populated with examples of such mechanisms 
(although it does not show a complete set). For example, decision support tools may be 
used to assess risk and privacy harms based on context before transferring personal 
information in the cloud, to advise on obligations to be passed to a CSP (within the 
contract, and associated with data) or to assess the suitability of a CSP before using it. 
In conclusion, the basic accountability framework was presented with a number of 
mechanisms across legal, regulatory and technological areas required. Some technological 
pieces are quite mature and others are less so. Further work is necessary on various fronts 
including provision of integrable techniques for attribution and redress. 
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3.1.6 Data Provenance 
Animator: Priscila Solis Barreto, University of Brasilia, Brazil 
Introduction 
When we see data on the Web, currently, we do not know where it came from and how it 
got there. This information and its source (provenance) is typically lost in the process of 
copying/ transcribing/transforming databases. Provenance is essential to data integrity, 
currency and reliability.  
Research in data provenance 
For provenance and its applications, we can focus on different motivating domains: 
1. Scientific Domains: - Scientists deal with greater heterogeneity in data and metadata- 
Trust, quality, and copyright of data are significant when using third-party data- E-
Science - Business Domains 
2. Virtual organizations:  workflows, warehouse environments, where lineage information 
is used to trace the data in the warehouse view back to the source from which it was 
generated.  
3. Governamental Domains: In Brazil, within the social inclusion policies this is a very 
important issue. Ex Voting system, taxing system   
4. Data Quality: use of lineage to estimate data quality and data reliability based on the 
source data and transformations 
5. Audit Trail: trace the audit trail of data, determine resource usage and errors in data 
generation. - Replication Recipes: allow repetition of data derivation, help maintain its 
currency and re-do replication 
6. Attribution: the pedigree can establish the copyright and ownership of data, help to 
determine liability in case of erroneous data.  
7. Informational: use of lineage to query metadata for data discovery.  
Some examples of the applications in the different domains are such as collecting and 
modelling provenance from heterogeneous applications and data sources, integrating 
distributed and incomplete provenance information to compose complete provenance 
models and the effective management and querying of distributed, semantic provenance 
repositories for different applications. 
There are a number of recommended actions within the scope of research cooperation 
projects are standardization of provenance models, services, and representations, 
provenance management architectures and techniques, analytic provenance and the 
relationship between provenance and visualization, provenance and the semantic web, 
human interpretation of provenance security and privacy implications of provenance, 
provenance and social media and provenance implications for trust. 
Within the BIC workshop, there was a suggestion is to foster concrete cooperation around a 
specific application domain such as Scientific, Business, Government and multidisciplinary 
approaches to include the concept of trust, privacy and security in future coordinated calls.  
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3.1.7 Social computing in emerging countries 
Animator: Marijke Coetzee, University of Johannesburg, South Africa 
Introduction 
Social Computing enables user-centric, collaborative knowledge sharing to build 
communities of people using the Internet. When Social Computing emerged around 2003, it 
was not thought that a few years later millions of users across the world would be using 
Social Computing applications such as online social networks, blogs, collaborative filtering 
of content, and many more. Social computing supports social behavior with computational 
systems by recreating social conventions and contexts using technology. At a more 
technical level, Social Computing is supported by technologies such as collaborative 
filtering, online auctions, and reputation systems and social network analysis.  There is 
great value in Social Computing systems as they are empowering users and driving the 
creation of new digital divides. Social Computing is a driver for growth and employment, is 
disrupting many industries and has the potential to reshape work, health and learning.  
Social Computing in emerging countries 
In Africa, Internet access is not affordable. In addition, low availability of international 
bandwidth, poorly structured markets, lack of existing infrastructure and low population 
densities all ensure that mobile is a strong entry point for networks in Africa. In many 
developing nations, the majority of mobile web users are mobile-only. For example, Egypt 
has 70% percent, India has 59 % and South Africa has 57% mobile-only users who tend to 
be under 25.  
Given the popularity of mobile-only Internet usage, it come as no surprise that the largest 
social network in Africa is Mxit (www.Mxit.com), a mobile social network. Mxit is a Java 
mobile application that connects users with a mobile phone to the Internet. It is estimated 
that Mxit has around 50-million users in 120 countries, supporting the sending of 23-billion 
very low-cost messages a month.  The key to Mxit's success lies in its simplicity. As the 
interface is not graphical and games are text-based, it works on nearly any mobile phone. 
This makes it ideal for emerging markets where smart phones are still out of reach for most 
people.  This African success story indicates that there is real potential in this market.  
In developing countries such as those found in Africa, mobile phones can be used as a tool 
to intervene and act as a competitive force in the social, economical and political 
development. For example, Egyptians changed history when they used social networks to 
bring down their president. There is an opportunity to develop mobile social networking as a 
business in Africa, to growth the very small enterprises in these countries. This can ensure 
that communities can develop into positive, productive and outstanding environments by 
combining modern technology with the natural predisposition of people to culturally support 
each other. This is because African entrepreneurs run profit ecosystems rather than 
business units. These ecosystems interact with other ecosystems in a culturally involved 
manner to ensure that the ecosystem will survive in the face of adversity. Social capital and 
social ties support these ecosystems and communities in large parts of Africa where 
members of communities pool resources together in an attempt to meet economic and 
social needs for both individual members and the general community. An identified need is 
the development of social computing technologies to support the growth and development 
of these ecosystems and communities to allow them to flourish.   
Social Computing challenges to address are Security and Privacy, as Social Computing 
applications have weak user identification management systems and Trust as it is a main 
driver for collaboration and innovation.  
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A research topic identified for international cooperation is the development of trust models, 
mechanisms and architectures to support Social Computing systems to support business 
ecosystems in rural Africa.  For these systems, it is important that trust management takes 
into account concepts relevant to the target context. An important identified focus of the 
research is the study of culture on trust. For Individualistic cultures, for which most trust 
management systems have been developed, consumer trust is facilitated through trust 
mechanisms such as institutional guarantees, laws and policies, information security 
mechanisms, and social controls.  In contrast, Collectivist cultures, found in Africa, Asia, 
India and South America have different needs as they interact in different ways. For 
example, in collectivist cultures people emphasize interpersonal relationships where loyalty 
is obtained by protecting the group members for life. Individuals see themselves as 
subordinate to a social collective such as a state, a nation, a race, or a social class. They 
prefer group harmony and consensus to individual achievement. 
In conclusion, this research topic is thus of interest not only to the African context, but to 
any environment where different types of cultures exist, and where an understanding of the 
influence of culture on trust is limited. It is therefore a topic that is ideal for collaboration 
between parties found in different countries in Europe, Africa, India and Brazil.  
3.1.8 Global perspectives of personalized Identity Management Ecosystem (GINI-
SA vision) 
Animator: Lefteris Leontaridis, NetSmart S.A., Greece  
Introduction 
GINI-SA is a Support Action for the European Commission, which aims to analyse how a 
Personalized Identity Management (PIM) ecosystem in which individuals can manage their 
digital identities and control the exchange of their identity information. Under the GINI 
vision, individuals would manage their identities by means of an Individual Digital Identity 
(INDI), a self-generated and self-managed digital identity, which is verifiable against one or 
more authoritative data sources. Once created, users would have the ability to link their 
INDI with authoritative identity data maintained by both public- and private-sector entities. 
This data (or links thereto) could then be presented by the user towards relying parties.  
Personalized IDM Ecosystem 
GINI foresees that INDI-type online identities will emerge and personalized services based 
on INDI requirements and features will be available to citizens and consumers in the 
following years, with a market appearing and maturing between 2015 - 2020. The 
emergence of such services will be underpinned by business models which drive, and are 
driven by, the emergence of an ecosystem linking three types of actors: Individual users, 
Relying Parties and Data ources 
The INDI allows individuals to act in various roles, for instance as citizens, employees, or 
customers. GINI assumes an operator model, i.e. the actor’s “User”, “Data Source”, and 
“Relying Party” are served by intermediary entities called INDI Operators. It may be 
possible for different roles to be managed through a single INDI operator, or to utilize 
multiple ones for different interactions, allowing for disintermediation and enhanced privacy. 
The user chooses which roles to act in and what information to reveal under the different 
roles. As one, or several, INDI operators may be used for different kinds of context, the 
user is able to manage a set of partial identities in a manner similar to the physical world, 
by providing the information that is relevant for each situation, including those cases where 
anonymity, pseudonymity, and limited attribute provision are desired and acceptable. 
As INDI is a new infrastructure, with no INDI market or operators existing as of today, there 
is a need of determining what prerequisites must be put in place, in order to enable private 
organizations to assume the tasks of INDI Operators. A variety of business models for INDI 
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Operators will emerge once the technical aspects of the INDI ecosystem’s infrastructure are 
implementable and a set of governance procedures are in place. 
The INDI ecosystem could be built upon a one-sided market, where the service provider 
and customer interact directly with one another, or a two-sided market, where different 
business models and pricing schemes are involved in a unified set of business 
transactions. Creating a two-sided market is much more complex and often transfer fees 
and other similar pricing models need to be applied.  
GINI Recommendations for Government, Industry and Researchers 
GINI is putting forward a set of recommendations towards three types of stakeholder: 
Industry, government and researchers. All these stakeholder communities are global and 
therefore strong international cooperation is needed to achieve the vision of an INDI-like 
ecosystem of global dimensions. Therefore, the following recommendations are indeed 
directed to the global stakeholders: 
1. Concerted action and international cooperation between global ICT market actors and 
particularly service providers such as Cloud operators and various identity 
intermediates is necessary to build consensus on where common understanding must 
be the basis for broad industry-wide agreements a issues such as user-centricity 
requirements and user control to identity and attribute provision, as well as privacy-
enhancement principles and rights of individuals including, but not limited to, the 
requirements of the upcoming privacy-related regulation in the EU.  
2. Industry-wide standardization initiatives should be undertaken at a global scale with a 
strong international cooperation dimension, supported by major technology and service 
providers, in order to define various dimensions of inter-operator interfaces, concerning 
interoperability and data handling processes ensuring privacy for users and 
confidentiality for relying parties, portability specifications aiming for compliance with 
upcoming EU regulation, protocols, APIs, auditing and security for cross-operator 
relaying of claims and assertions. 
3. Data handling principles and decisions by governments will be pivotal for the 
emergence of an INDI-like ecosystem. Privacy-respecting legislation should be 
harmonized globally in order not to create silos and market fragmentation. All world 
regions and major markets should cooperate towards a shared, commonly accepted 
governance and regulatory framework. 
4. The role of governments should be examined to determine whether (and to what extent) 
further regulation is needed or whether (and to what extent) industry self-governance 
would suffice. This needs to happen at a global scale so international cooperation is 
essential as no single world region can contain identity provision services. 
5. Further RTD work is needed on trust meta-models through interdisciplinary research 
involving more than technology but also social sciences, with a strong dimension for 
international cooperation. Further RTD work is needed on the process of technology-
linked innovation, particularly as driven by behavioral motivation, e.g. by privacy. Strong 
international cooperation is needed in these research areas to account for cultural 
differences across world regions. 
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3.1.9 Photos from the session 
 
 
WG1 breakout session 
3.2 WG2. Network Information Security / cyber security  
3.2.1 Chair/Rapporteur Introduction 
Authors: Jim Clarke, Waterford Institute of Technology, Ireland; Michel Riguidel, Telecom 
ParisTech, France, and contributions from the animators.  
The research areas related to network and information security / cyber security are now 
receiving high priority for international collaboration. Some recent examples are highlighted 
here: 
• EU–US INCO-Trust workshop of May 2010 [12], 
• Munich Security Conference, 4-6th February, 2011 [13] 
• US-UK Cyber Communiqué of 25th May 2011[14], 
• Recent accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime [15], 
• 28th Annual International Workshop on Global Security on June 16, 2011 [16],  
• Vienna Security conference, 1st July 2011 [17], 
• London Cybersecurity Conference (1-2nd November 2011) [18], and 
• BIC Annual Forum (29th November 2011) [19].  
A key message throughout all of these events is the acknowledgement that international 
cooperation is nascent and a more global approach is urgently needed because there is 
ultimately just one, single, global information environment, consisting of the 
interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers. It is essential that we have the ability to conduct comprehensive intelligence 
collection and evaluation on any developing situation that threatens our cyberspace 
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activity, followed by near-simultaneous processing, exploiting and disseminating of the 
information. This depends on multi-stakeholders engaged in collaboration, including data 
exchange and sharing (and also knowledge sharing) between countries. This WG will 
focus on the key elements within these important areas and inter-related technical areas. 
As a starting point, it was agreed that WG2 would focus on the following topics: 
• International data exchange architecture for cybersecurity; 
• policies relating to how the collected cyber-intelligence is to be handled, exchanged, 
shared and utilised; 
• Open source trustworthy host platform for collaborative research and education; 
• International cooperation in Cryptology; 
• Mobile security of software services; 
• The planning and improvement of joint exercises related to cyber security across 
borders. 
While the majority of these were covered during the workshop, we were also delighted to 
receive additional contributions / position papers / requests for topics from the following 
research fields for international cooperation during the planning phase of the workshop: 
Emerging threats and actors, Digital forensics, security and virtualization, international 
approaches for critical infrastructure protection, and implications arising from identity and 
privacy related issues on a global scale. 
The presentations were of a very high quality and the content and discussions are 
summarized here.  
The key points are: 
1. The emergence of new threats and new vulnerabilities with new architectures (e.g. 
clouds), new usages (e.g. social networks), and massive mobility applications (mobile 
applications within smartphones) and huge multimedia exchanges (generalisation of 
music and video flows); 
2. The obligation of a n international cooperation to exchange cyber security data and 
intelligence to fight against borderless attacks; 
3. The reinforcement of coordination in cryptography application at the european level to 
develop robust algorithms for the new usage (enhanced privacy, massive exchange 
in core networks, mobile e-commerce).; 
4. The massive emergence of smarrtphone applications with new vulnerabilities and 
future attacks; 
5. The requirement of a better resilience for critical infrastructures and the enhancement 
of specification and dissemination for crisis management procedures and tools. 
6. The new situation of computer science application in computing, storing and 
communication with the virtualization phenomenon which erases the notion of space 
and boundaries, making more difficult indeed impossible the legislation enforcement 
at the country level; 
7. The reinforcement of digital identity at the global scale, requiring more efforts to 
protect privacy of individuals and enterprises. 
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3.2.2 Emerging threats and actors 
Animator: Sotiris Ioannidis, FORTH, Greece 
Introduction 
The recent Stuxnet incident has been an eye-opener regarding the possible impact of 
advanced, targeted attacks that can be performed by sophisticated actors with significant 
resources at their disposal. The attack clearly showed how our current defence tools, 
policies, and infrastructures failed in front of a threat that was designed to focus against a 
specific target instead of blindly targeting the entire community.  
Malicious hardware can also be used as a very subtle vector to perform extremely hard to 
detect attacks against critical infrastructures, large corporations, and government 
organizations. However, targeted attacks do not necessarily need to be extremely 
sophisticated and, even in their simplest forms, can pose a very serious threat against 
normal users. Targeted SPAM, for example, is extremely effective in phishing users 
credentials. We envision ad-hoc banking trojans could be developed in the near future to 
avoid detection by targeting only a restricted group of individuals. 
In addition, we believe there is a serious risk that attackers will soon start developing 
automated techniques to customize attacks based on private user information and 
aggregated data collected from multiple online sources. 
Security of New and Emerging Technologies:  
Analyzing and securing emerging technologies has always been a core objective in the 
area of system security. Unfortunately, it is often the case that new services and new 
devices are released before the research community has had a chance of studying their 
security implications. 
In the near future, we can identify four topics, in the area of international cooperation and 
new and emerging technologies, which need to be studied from a security point of view:  
1. Cloud Computing - The Cloud is quickly changing the way companies run their 
business. Servers can be quickly launched and shut down via application 
programming interfaces, offering the user a greater flexibility compared to traditional 
server rooms. From a system security perspective, there are a number of aspects 
that are specific to cloud computing. For instance, the impact of “insider threats”, the 
issues related to privacy and “data management”, and the attacks against the 
“virtualization” infrastructure. 
2. Online Social Networks - As these online communities, such as Facebook, 
MySpace, Orkut, Twitter, LinkedIn, and others, have been adopted by millions of 
Internet users, miscreants have started abusing them for a variety of purposes, 
including stalking, identity theft, spamming, direct advertising, spreading of malware, 
etc. Monitoring and securing social networks is therefore very important to protect 
the users from a large spectrum of attacks. 
3. Smart Meters - This new class of devices is a clear example of a new technology 
that has been rapidly deployed without the required security protection mechanisms. 
Studying and fixing these devices in particular, but also extending previous work 
done in more general sensor networks should therefore be one of the goals of 
system security researchers. 
4. SCADA Networks - Even though SCADA is not exactly a new technology, these 
devices were initially designed to be isolated and thus built with certain underlying 
security assumptions. Since many industrial process control systems became 
reachable from the outside (even when, as shown by Stuxnet, the attacker has to 
cross an “airgap”), the security of these networks has become an important priority. 
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3.2.3 International Data exchange architecture for cooperation on cyber security 
and intelligence 
Animator: John C. Mallery, CSAIL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. USA 
International collaboration and coordination can rapidly reduce defensive gaps across the 
individual countries and build capacities for crisis response. Without systematic and 
expeditious international coordination, attackers can replay attacks across different 
countries. This structural advantage for attackers can only be offset by collective defences 
incorporating rapid international learning to identify, disrupt and defend against innovative 
attacks across their lifecycles from reconnaissance and testing to deployment.  
Collective cyber defence against threats from cybercriminals, hacktivists, terrorists and 
nation-states in peace or in war requires an effective architecture for scalable real-time data 
sharing, collaborative analysis, and rapid threat mitigation. Development of such real-world 
defensive capabilities poses challenges that can drive both applied and fundamental 
research.  
An international program of research will broaden awareness, understanding and capacity 
across participating countries, and deepen technical knowledge around data sharing and 
analysis tasks. The integration of national expertise and experience can facilitate faster 
learning and transfer new and effective concepts into operational practice to fight crime, 
close defensive gaps, protect intellectual property and coordinate defences against 
malicious state actors. Objectives include creation of shared data collection, analysis and 
protection methodologies. International aggregation of cyber data on crime and law 
enforcement, black markets, economics, state interactions, long-term cyber-fuelled 
transformations will enable tracking trends as they emerge and counteracting malicious 
techniques, tools and procedures before they diffuse widely. These transnational datasets 
on breaches, attack patterns, best practices, and defensive coordination will enhance 
common situational awareness and will enable retrodictive metrics of efficacy for 
countermeasures.  
Legal and regulatory barriers to cyber data sharing remain a significant challenge to 
defensive coordination. Thus, international cooperation can also drive legal harmonization 
to support shared collection, fusion, analysis, and response capabilities. Legal and policy 
incentives, in combination with actionable results, will also need to motivate private and 
public actors to coordinate at the sectoral and national levels. 
International dimension and its challenges 
The first step in an international initiative is to engineer a cyber data strategy that 
recommends what to collect in each domain prioritized by its purpose, and how to 
harmonize processing and analysis. The strategy needs to identify clear procedures for 
sharing various data according to sensitivity, for sanitization based on concerns about 
privacy or sources and methods, and for defining exchange formats and delivery times. 
They should include context, specific sharing purpose, and ultimately lifespan of the 
sharing. Importantly, the strategy needs to identify synergies arising from integrating data 
across national boundaries and its impact on the participating countries. 
Numerous precedents can inform the strategy across a range of sectors and issue areas. 
The European Network & Information Security Agency 5  (ENISA) collects, analyzes, 
disseminates data on InfoSec in a pan European context. DHS Predict 6  (US) has 
developed a legal framework for sharing cyber data within the United States, which has 
                                               
 
5 European Network & Information Security Agency, http://www.enisa.europa.eu/ 
6 DHS Predict, https://www.predict.org/ 
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been extended to Canada and soon to the European Union. The European Commission 
funded Wombat Project7 has fielded collaborative sensors for Internet malware and attack 
data. The European Public-private Partnership For Resilience 8  has focused on critical 
information infrastructure protection. The Financial Services Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center9 (FS-ISAC) brings together US financial sector entities and aggregates 
data collected from its members after anonymizing it. The non-profit National Cyber 
Forensics and Training Alliance10 (US) integrates information and analysis for the financial 
services sector across private, public and academic communities. The Confickr Working 
Group is a well-known example of informal but effective cooperation as are the Anti-
Phishing Working Group and Digital Phishnet. Lessons can be drawn from these and other 
collaborations to architect effective international cyber data collection and analysis. 
The critical ingredient for success is incentivizing participation of national governments and 
private actors by demonstrating the advantages of multinational scale, the synergies of 
international cooperation and the direct benefits to participants. International scale can help 
drive increased quality and integrity of data. Guidelines for managing data collection and 
sharing that respect local law and cultural sensitivities can reduce impediments to 
participation. Finally, clear identification and mitigation of the risks of sharing can assuage 
concerns of governments and private actors. Furthermore, security solutions 11  for 
acquisition, storage, processing and transfer of data can be deployed to reduce risks while 
enabling benefits. 
Some of the research and development areas necessary to support this effort include: 
• Architectures for collection, analysis, policy enforcement  
• Representation and structure of data  
• Policy representation and understanding  
• Implementation of data sharing, including data formats, standards, tools, 
usability 
• Security, including secure host with strong isolation, access control 
management, policy enforcement, data integrity, provenance tracing  
• Cryptographic techniques, including data splitting, differential privacy, cypher 
text arithmetic 
• Development of a trustworthy platform for data sharing and analysis 
• Creation of a test bed for concept demonstration. 
As shown in Figure 6, a strawman architecture was generated and this was described in 
more detail at the workshop. Due to the duration of the session, it wasn’t possible to get 
                                               
 
7  European Commission FP7 Wombat Project, http://www.wombat-project.eu/ 
8 European Public-private Partnership For Resilience, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/nis/strategy/activities/ciip/impl_activities/index_en.htm 
9 Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-ISAC), 
http://www.fsisac.com/ 
10 National Cyber Forensics and Training Alliance, http://www.ncfta.net/ 
11 Security solutions will include operating system security, cryptographic techniques, harmonized 
vetting procedures and access control mechanisms, and data protection techniques like slicing, 
aggregation or incremental revelation. 
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into very technical discussions but there was instead a focus on advancing this work to the 
next level and commitment to formulate a strategy for research and development 
coordination, which will enhance the outcomes through tactical planning, leveraging and 
combining task-relevant national expertise.  
Malicious actors in cyberspace actively exploit the shortcomings in the ability of defenders 
to coordinate their activities. They can rerun the same attacks against different countries, 
sectors and organizations so long as cyber data and countermeasures are not being 
shared effectively.  
An architecture for international and cross-sector sharing of cyber threat and attack data 
will ensure a more effective collective cyber defense than countries, sectors or 
organizations might otherwise achieve individually.  
 
 
Figure 6. A Strawman International Cyber Data Sharing Architecture 
 
Figure 6 illustrates an international cyber data sharing architecture that integrates data from 
multiple countries and sectors and returns collaboratively produced analyses and threat 
mitigation techniques. Country fusion centers integrate country information and expertise 
internationally. Within each country and across its sectors, shared monitoring 
infrastructures capture base cyber data at sources. This data is processed to remove 
personally identifiable information (PII) before being analyzed using shared algorithms to 
produce results fed back into shared situational awareness. The architecture supports 
sector-based threat mitigation cycles as well as enterprise information assurance 
management of value at risk. The architecture supports learning modalities like data 
refinement to improve data capture, analysis and utility in threat mitigation. Based on 
knowledge gained about vulnerabilities and attacker vectors, the architecture helps drive 
improvement of enterprise and infrastructure architectures to improve defensibility. 
This kind of sharing scenario can drive research along many trajectories. The type of data 
collected needs to be effective and offer leverage for cyber defense. Large-scale analytics 
over the data need to reveal important patterns in real time and lead to timely threat 
mitigation. Given an effective sharing architecture, major malicious actors will endeavor to 
corrupt the data and subvert its operation, and so resilient and trustworthy engineering will 
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be needed for all components from sensors to hosts, monitoring, analysis and mitigation 
actions. At the same time, PII and enterprise information must be protected to respect 
important societal values and incentivizing sharing. Difficult technical, legal and 
administrative challenges in international authentication, authorization, encryption and 
remote policy enforcement must be overcome to reach higher levels of trust and sharing 
necessary for weaponizable data like critical infrastructure attacks and mitigations. 
We need to look at optimising the integration of both technical and economic perspectives 
to favour defensive interventions that disrupt malicious business models. Figure 7 illustrates 
the limited scope of conventional technical approaches to cyber defence. By integrating 
understanding of the attack business model, defenders gain additional opportunities to 
disrupt the attacker anywhere on his value cycle using passive or active means. 
Additionally, the resources, capabilities and motivations of the attacker provide constraints 
on the range of technical defences necessary for effective defence. 
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Fig. 7 Optimising integration of technical and economic perspectives for cybersecurity. 
 
At the workshop, there was strong agreement to identify the stakeholders in the 
architecture diagram (Figure 6) and to assemble a team to begin developing an 
international project consortium together, perhaps starting with a smaller number of 
countries and advancing to more later. 
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3.2.4 International Approaches to cryptography 
Animator: Bart Preneel, COSIC, KU Leuven 
The key developments in ICT are the trend towards cloud computing and towards the 
Internet of things; both complex environments will have to interact in a secure way.  These 
developments impact the future research agenda in cryptology, as explained below.  
In the area of cryptographic algorithms, the main challenge is to push the limits for high 
speed performance in the cloud and to optimize the energy and footprint for the Internet of 
things.  An important challenge is the creation of highly efficient and robust algorithms for 
authenticated encryption.  For a limited number of applications long term security is 
required; in order to push the lifetime of current public key systems beyond 30 years, a 
sustained research effort is needed on novel algorithms (post-quantum cryptography).  The 
most appropriate way to achieve these goals is through open international competitions that 
stretch over multiple years.  Such competitions also require the development of common 
tools for the evaluation of the security and performance of cryptographic algorithms. 
Advanced cryptographic protocols are needed to support privacy and user control in the 
cloud and in the Internet of things; as these two worlds need to interoperate, key goals are 
the development of functional encryption, the distribution of secrets to avoid single points of 
failure, the optimization of dedicated multiparty protocols and the development of novel 
protocols based on tamper resistance.  Cryptography has a key role to play in the 
developments of privacy-by-design, and this in applications such as metering, 
subscriptions, information sharing and data retrieval.   A particularly challenging and high-
impact application is e-voting. 
Creating cryptographic implementations that are secure and efficient is extremely 
challenging.   In this area there is a need for foundational research combined with the 
development of advanced tools.  Novel technologies such as Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs), whitebox cryptography should be further explored, as they have a high 
potential for particular contexts. 
Global context 
The worldwide cryptographic community consists of several thousand researchers. 
Typically, around 1,600 are members of the IACR, the International Association for 
Cryptology Research; this not-for-profit association sponsors the seven top conferences 
and workshops in the field; and an additional 7-10 events are organized each year in 
cooperation with the IACR.  The IACR also publishes the prestigious Journal of Cryptology, 
the leading journal in its field.   
European researchers play a central role in this organization and it is fair to state that 
European researchers take a very strong position internationally; the ECRYPT and 
ECRYPTII networks of excellence have played a central role in strengthening this position. 
In several fields, such as symmetric cryptology, novel public key algorithms, lightweight 
cryptography, cryptanalysis, cryptographic hardware, cryptographic software for embedded 
systems, and secure implementations, European researchers are internationally leading. 
However, cryptographic standardization is mostly driven by US, as the key bodies are NIST 
and IETF.  In addition, one can observe that in both the US and Asia (China, India, Japan, 
Korea, Singapore) there is a substantial increase of funding in this strategic area; these 
developments will make it harder for European researchers to remain competitive.  The 
emergence of cloud computing has also strengthened the impact of US industry on the 
global processing and protection of data.  
The fast developments in the area of cryptology require a long term research effort to 
maintain and strengthen the leading position of the European academic and industrial 
world.  Cryptology plays a strategic role in the security of our society, as cryptology defines 
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who controls and accesses information and devices; this is essential for protecting the 
privacy of the European citizens and the transparency and efficiency of markets.  
As the developments of cloud computing and the Internet of things are global 
developments, there is also a strong need for international collaboration on a strategic 
research agenda in cryptology.  
 
3.2.5 Mobile Security 
Animator: Abhishek Sharma, Beyond Evolution TechSolutions Pvt. Ltd., Gurgaon, India 
Introduction 
The extent and dimensions of the usage of mobile devices flooded with numerous 
applications has extended to practically all spheres of human life. These devices are now 
used for communication by voice, entertainment, social media, utility, information gathering 
- news, sports etc are assuming unimaginable proportions. With organizations increasingly 
looking toward mobile devices (e.g., iPhones, iPads, and Android smart devices) to deliver 
content and functionality to both their employees and their customer base and the people 
started utilizing power of mobile applications more and more, the mobile devices are 
becoming the fastest growing consumer technology. However, most find it difficult to 
understand and evaluate the security concerns that surround mobile platforms. Since 
mobile computing is a relatively new concept in the enterprise, many organizations have 
not yet updated their information security policy to cater for it. With about 600 million smart 
phones in 2010, they are poised to crossing approximately the 1.9 billion mark by the year 
2013. Moving along with this, the growth and availability of mobile applications are 
multiplying the threat factors exponentially. Hence, Smart Phones, mobile apps, remote 
data, consumerization of IT and the rise of malware and criminal intent presents a lethal 
cocktail of security threats to the consumer, corporation and the mobile networks. 
Mobile Security Scenario 
In the world of computers and communications, the more widely a technology is used, the 
more likely it is to become the target of hackers. The enormously growing popularity of 
mobile applications has attracted enough hackers to make the potential for serious security 
threats a reality. More than 55,000 new pieces of malware are seen on a daily basis as per 
the report. Research shows that the number of mobile malware more than doubled in 2011 
from 2010.   
Ten years ago, CTOs wanted company phones locked down, camera phones and iPods 
banned from the office. Now they are being forced to contemplate bring-your-own-device 
(BYOD), whether that’s a smart phone or a tablet, which is probably a CTO’s worst 
nightmare. Meanwhile, consumers and business people alike are adopting a laissez-faire 
attitude to downloading mobile apps – powerful computer programs that could potentially 
contain malicious code – from unknown authors, something few people would do on their 
PC. Yet, a staggering 96 percent of Smart Phones and tablets do not have third-party 
security software installed. On the other hand, 2,500 different types of mobile malware were 
discovered in 2011. 
What is under Threat? 
Mobile devices increasingly face various types of threats, from mere annoyance to invasion 
of privacy, propagation, malicious tools or stealing money. Some of the most threatened 
mobile applications are money transfers or mobile commerce; Stored data on phone 
devices – this is growing in volume with growing storage capacity of the devices;  Remote 
Data Storage OTA-with applications allowing data storage on cloud the three elements - 
Transmission, Storage and Access - have become vulnerable;  Mobile Health Care, a very 
potential and fast growing area for mobile applications; OS Platform- they make the mobile 
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itself useless;  many other utility applications such as  Maps, Location Based Services; 
Games, other entertainment applications – here the hackers take advantage of people’s  
weakness  to get glued to games and thereby ignore warnings.  
Threats to mobile money transactions could be one of the most dangerous and painful 
security threat. The value of mobile payment transactions is projected to reach almost $630 
billion by 2014. Mobile money transactions are an attractive target for attackers as they 
allow direct monetization of attacks. 
App Vulnerability: Like desktop / laptop computers, mobile apps too suffer from a myriad of 
security vulnerabilities. Many of these vulnerabilities are unintentional, caused by poor 
programming practices. Vulnerabilities can also be intentional and malicious, hidden within 
a seemingly safe and legitimate app. Some security vulnerabilities occur when sensitive 
data is transmitted to and from remote servers over unencrypted channels. Perhaps the 
most severe app vulnerabilities are those that exploit lax security of stored data. 
How does the Threat work? 
Besides analyzing the vulnerability, it is important to analyze the sources of such threats 
and how they manage to cause damage. The damage from a threat is a combination of 
source and channel to carry out the threat. While few of the main sources causing security 
threat are malicious applications, spyware and phishing besides many more, of which the 
commonly used channels are social networking, Bluetooth, Wi–Fi Hotspot and Botnets. 
Briefly describing a few major ones – a Botnet is a collection of compromised devices 
connected to the Internet. The malware gives hackers remote control of the compromised 
devices, which can then be instructed to perform harmful acts. The easiest way for an 
attacker to benefit from a mobile Botnet is to send an SMS or multimedia message service 
(MMS) communications to a premium phone account that charges victims fees per 
message. Malicious applications are usually free and get on a phone because users 
voluntarily install them. Once on a handset, the programs steal personal information such 
as account passwords and logins and send it back to the hacker. Social Networking has 
seen growth in enormous proportion with the similar growth in the use of smart phone. As 
fallout, mobile malicious links on social networks are effectively spreading malware. 
Participants tend to trust such networks and are thus willing to click on links that are on 
“friends’” social networking sites. Spyware available online are used to hijack a phone by 
hackers, allowing them to hear calls, see text messages and e-mails, and even track a 
user’s location through GPS updates. Bluetooth enables direct communication between 
mobile devices. Such Wireless devices broadcast their presence and allow unsolicited 
connections. In the case of Wi-Fi, hackers intercept communications between smart 
phones and Wi-Fi hotspots. In such a scenario, with no encryption to protect transmitted 
data, the hacker gets in between the user and the hotspot provider and hijacks the session 
via a man-in-the-middle attack. Phishing poses the same risk on Smart Phones as it does 
on desktop platforms. Mobile phishing is particularly tempting because wireless 
communications enable phishing not only via e-mail, as is the case with PCs, but also via 
SMS and MMS. Social media phishing is becoming a major issue as social networking sites 
contain an increasing amount of personal information. So to sum it up, the way the threat 
works may be classified as follows: 
• Intentional & Malicious Vulnerabilities: These are  
– Malware hidden within seemingly safe Apps – they attack OS and make the 
devices unusable.   
– Rogue Apps – they lead to some undesirable performances or even some 
intentional misdirected actions such as stealing personal data or money transfers 
– Attacking stored Data-once the access to the data is achieved, almost any misuse 
of someone’s data is possible. 
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• Unintentional Vulnerabilities: these are mainly attributable to mistakes committed by 
users themselves such as not using password protection or weak password, 
download Apps without verification of source, unprotected use of mobile internet etc. 
• Programming Practices & Languages: App developers at times fail to validate input 
from the Web, allowing adversaries to access protected files, or they might hardcode 
passwords, allowing unauthorized access to user files and the app’s source code. 
Some vulnerabilities arise from the programming languages with which apps are 
implemented. For example, languages such as JavaScript open the possibility of 
attacks via those who exploit Web browser vulnerabilities. Older programming 
languages such as C are prone to a host of well-known security vulnerabilities, such 
as buffer overflows, heap overflows, format string attacks, etc. Using third-party 
libraries, regardless of the implementation language, can also open up the potential 
for vulnerabilities. 
How to address the Threat? 
At the core of addressing such security threat in the mobile environment are two basic 
concepts - Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) & Wireless Intrusion Prevention 
System (WIPS).  Keeping these basics as the building blocks, it is required to focus at few 
specific approaches  
• Vetting the Apps by Purchasing organizations or a third-party labs before buying them 
is another approach. Currently, app stores don’t incorporate a vet ting process that 
thoroughly examines potential security vulnerabilities in apps. This is partly 
attributable to the cost and time associated with vetting an app, as well as the 
complex and contentious interactions needed with developers, given the growing 
potential for dangerous and widespread vulnerabilities, it’s becoming increasingly 
critical to vet apps for such vulnerabilities. 
• Creating Strong Mobile platform with robust OS and associated with traditional safety 
approaches such as preventive measures like firewall and usage of anti-virus 
software. 
• Increased usage Encryption software and encouraging more and more researchers 
and industry elements such as companies to work on this area. At present there are 
not many such apps as there development is complicated and challenging and the 
market is limited. 
• Incorporating some regulatory aspects ensure and manage the usage of encryption 
software which takes into account some other associated aspects related to laws of 
the land, other security concerns of the government such as lawful interceptions to 
address crime and terrorism. 
• Inclusion of certain E-Services that are specifically designed and developed to Protect 
Privacy such as vetting the mobile apps before they are allowed to be used, defining 
limits for accessibility to stored data etc. it’s also necessary to vet the app store. 
However, the vetting process poses several challenges, such as  specifying security 
and analysis requirements; identifying appropriate tools, mechanism, and approaches 
for analyzing security vulnerabilities and finding appropriate personnel to manually vet 
the apps.. and an infrastructure for testing the apps for security. 
• Enhancing the scope of App certification process to pay special emphasis on the 
Trust & Security aspect of the App to be certified is another way to ensure threat 
avoidance from third party apps. Today the app certification approach and extent 
varies with platform – Java, Symbian etc. 
• Education is key: It all comes down to education. Users have to be made aware of the 
threat and ways to protect their devices and Apps. But also it is important to build 
devices that protect the user without them having to make informed decisions – but 
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as we have seen with PCs this isn’t easy. Awareness about Mobile Access 
confidentiality is a simple and effective way which although already provided by the 
OEMs, the lack of awareness and the indifferent attitude of users pose a major 
challenge to the success of this approach. 
Way Forward - Key suggestions 
• Collaborative efforts: Lots of work is going on across the globe to address threat to 
the mobile security and associated entities. Unfortunately, a majority of all that are 
happening in isolation, in pockets. Major collaborative efforts are required, in highly 
organized manner to achieve the maximum out of all those efforts and to derive the 
best possible results optimally.. The coordination and collaboration is required to 
Create a Centralized Body (like ITU) who shall Formulate Regulatory Policies, define 
Standards, Tools & Test Beds, organize Coordination amongst different scattered 
research bodies and entities involved in developing mobile security measures and 
apps, organize consolidation and compilation of available and ongoing work and 
organizing their development and dissemination through industry sources. The 
International Advisory Group (IAG) within BIC can make major contributions in this 
direction through its supporting Core Working Group (CWG) and Extended Working 
Groups (EWG). 
• Structured Management: In order to achieve the organized coordination, structured 
management approach is essential. Apex body at the core supported by bodies and 
groups formed function wise and region wise with similar dissemination further on to 
micro level ensuring the numbers of layers kept at bare minimum are essential to 
manage such huge, complex and critical objective. 
• Focused Objectives: The research work has inherent weakness of growing out of 
proportion and at times also loosing focus. It is imperative at the part of the all 
coordinating and managing bodies to start the work with well defined objectives and 
stay focused on the same. 
• Introducing specific Regulatory mechanism through ITU: In addition to the above, one 
of the most important and possibly most effective measure would be to create a 
mandatory regulated mechanism controlling security aspects right at the device OEM 
level. The greater possibility of these attacks will place an increasing importance on 
mobile device makers to include security features and configuration options in place.  
The central Telecom regulatory body ITU need to setup an empowered body within 
itself to impress upon the OEMs and ensure that suitable security measures are 
incorporated within the devices such that only certified applications be made available 
to users either for Free usage or paid ones. This aspect will of course impose certain 
restrictions on the genuine App developers but by way of keeping the costs of such 
certifications low (e.g. just few dollars) but at the same time making the tests 
procedures thorough and comprehensive particularly against any security threats, 
would go a long way in ensuring the safety of the mobile, mobile apps and mobile 
users.  
Why is international cooperation important in this particular topic? 
Today, the information and communication technologies, be it voice or data, has made the 
geographical boundaries irrelevant. Along with this today and more so in future, significant 
amounts of confidential operation like banking transaction, mail/ data exchanging will take 
place from mobile only. In addition, critical utility services management of power, water and 
other infrastructure services too besides services like health care and education would 
have mobile phones and apps playing major role. However, despite the world getting 
connected, the regional elements on the demands, requirements, behavior and need of the 
people still vary to a great extent. At the same time the provisioning of the mobile systems - 
devices and applications are happening across the globe cutting across the regional 
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boundaries. Devices and applications developed in one corner of the globe are equally 
utilized across the globe. The same is the case with the creation and proliferation of 
malware, rogue applications and such security risks. Accordingly, since the smartphone / 
mobile penetration is increasing globally, it makes a lot of sense that all regions of the world 
- Europe, Asia/ India/China, Americas, Africa collaborate closely for the Research & 
Industrial Developments. It is therefore not just natural but essential that the research and 
development work to address the threats and risks to mobile security is pursued with help 
of intense International cooperation and managed with globally collaborative mechanism.  
The Final Word 
As the spread and utilization of mobile devices grow, they will face risks of growing attacks 
in number and variety. It is critical to understand what is there to lose before a mobile 
security breach occurs. The ultimate goal is not about aiming to achieve something 
unrealistic -complete elimination mobile security risks. Such ultimate safety and risk 
prevention may not be possible. However it is rather essential to have systems in place to 
minimize the impact when breaches occur. Towards this goal, there is need for regular and 
sustained work across all stakeholders - Device OEMs, App developers, VAS providers, 
Network Service Providers/ TELCOs and, last but not the least, the mobile users 
themselves to first, take the threat seriously and then, constantly participate in the lookout 
for threats and search for their solutions.  
3.2.6 International approaches to critical infrastructure protection 
Animator: Manmohan Chaturvedi, IIT Delhi, India 
Introduction 
Critical infrastructures (CI) have become the central nervous system of the economy in all 
countries and a key national security concern. Their interdependencies compound the 
challenge in securing them from various threats. From the available statistics we can safely 
conclude that threats to Critical Infrastructures from state and non-state actors, driven by 
diverse underlying motivations, have grown in number and intensity. The challenge to a 
nation state is to initiate comprehensive steps to mitigate their ill effects. We need to 
identify a comprehensive yet parsimonious set of steps that can be initiated at national level 
to address these emerging threats. 
Need for a suitable metric 
We cannot improve anything unless we can measure it. While it is easy to measure 
physical parameters like temperature and pressure, complex constructs like security level 
of a nation or a critical sector are difficult to articulate in social science.   
International Challenge 
Critical Infrastructure protection is an international concern. Multi-dimensional approach is 
necessary to achieve success in this venture. Following key questions need to be 
addressed: 
a) How to identify and prioritize the dimensions of an Index to measure the CI 
protection initiative? 
b)  How to identify and prioritize important indicators under each dimension? 
c) How to measure progress on each dimension? 
d) Is it possible to provide a composite index of a CI’s security status at regular 
interval? 
e) Is it possible to identify areas in need of urgent action?  
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Recommended Methodology for CI protection 
Amongst the various CIs of our modern society all appear important when viewed 
individually. Delphi methodology may help identification of “critical few” from a 
comprehensive list. Delphi Method, first introduced by Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer 
during their association with the Rand Corporation in the 1950s is uniquely suited to 
studying topics with little historical evidence, related to rapidly changing events and of great 
complexity. In Delphi approach we are interested in collecting the judgments of experts on 
a particular topic to document and assess those judgments. 
Interpretive Structural Modeling (ISM) (Warfield, 1974) can articulate the hierarchical 
relationships among them in terms of driving power and dependency. This permits short 
listing CIs that are at root of the hierarchical model for further prioritized action. Matrice 
d’Impacts Croises Multiplication Appliquee a un Classment (MICMAC) analysis (Duperin 
and Godet, 1973) can be used to unveil hidden indirect influences among these CIs. 
AHP is one of the Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) methods and the underlying 
principle of MCDM is that these decisions have to be made by means of sets of criteria. By 
applying this principle; Saaty (1980) developed AHP which models a hierarchical decision 
problem framework that consists of multiple levels of criteria having unidirectional 
relationships. AHP works with such hierarchy that can combine both subjective (intangible) 
and objective (tangible) criteria. 
Illustrative research approach to derive index of a critical sector 
At IIT Delhi, we have attempted in an ongoing research to define a construct of National 
Information Security Index (NISI) in Indian context using combination of Delphi and AHP. 
The interim findings of the research and illustrative use of NISI to measure a nation’s 
security index provide us a template for design and computation of a sector specific 
security index.  
Recommendations 
• The illustrative use of the NISI for tracking India’s progress to secure her Cyber 
Space can be replicated to design Security Index for the prioritized CIs/sectors 
• The index can be used to track progress in securing these prioritized CIs/sectors  
• Suitability of this approach to EU and other national  context could be considered 
Relevance of International Cooperation in CI protections 
The threats to the ICT systems of all CIs can emanate across national boundaries and 
therefore, all nations can benefit from cooperation. For the Horizon 2020, the security of the 
evolving Next Generation Networks (NGN) could be considered for the international 
cooperation. The NGN would amplify the threat vectors with their IP protocol based 
approach to communication and ubiquitous use of smart phones as the preferred mode of 
online transactions. 
3.2.7 Security and virtualisation 
Animator: Syed Naqvi, Centre d'Excellence en Technologies de l'Information et de la 
Communication (CETIC), Belgium 
Introduction  
Virtualization infrastructures present promising features to address the ever-increasing 
demands of information society. The concept of virtualization is not new in the field of ICT. 
It dated back to the inception of programming language compilers that virtualize the object 
code [20]. However, the concept of virtualization infrastructures, where physical resources 
are dynamically mapped to address the spontaneous business needs, is relatively new. 
Moreover, the scale and scope of this novel concept brings several challenges for its 
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deployment including a lot of uncertainty as to how and where to implement security [21]. 
Classical security solutions and practices are getting obsolete in the face of the peculiar 
security requirements of virtualization infrastructures. Therefore, security and dependability 
issues of virtualization infrastructures are emerging as gauging factor for measuring the 
success of this Endeavour. 
The inherent nature of virtualization requires totally different security provisioning approach 
than the classical one developed decades ago. Classical IT security solutions and practices 
require precise information of the underlying infrastructure for their deployment and 
functional validation. They cannot be applied to these virtual infrastructures due to the 
intrinsic characteristic of virtualisation that provides abstraction to the underlying resources 
and infrastructures. This section examines two major security challenges of virtualization 
infrastructures – security audit and digital investigations. Finally, a quick glance of a 
federated Cloud security experiment funded by the European Commission is given before 
drawing some perspectives of international cooperation in the area of virtualisation security. 
Security Audit of Virtualisation Infrastructures 
Security audit assess the security of a networked system’s physical configuration and 
environment, software, information handling processes, and user practices. Various 
security audit standards such as Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS) 
require audit of the physical controls [22]. The virtualisation infrastructures provide an 
abstraction layer to the underlying lower-level details. This situation raises several security 
concerns such as multi-tenancy; lack of security tools [23]; and disparity with the classical 
IT security audit practices. Another important issue in this regard is the data export control 
that requires operators and providers to ensure that particular kind of data should only be 
stored and processed in some specific location. Audit inspectors need to certify compliance 
to these regulations for the issuance of the operating licenses to infrastructure and service 
providers. Check-pointing mechanisms including monitoring tools are indispensable for 
auditors (both internal and external) to verify that operators and providers are respecting 
the corresponding regulations. 
There exist a number of generic monitoring tools such as hardware monitoring (e.g. HP 
Insight Manager, Dell Open Manage, VMWare Virtual Center, etc.), performance monitoring 
(e.g. VizionCore, Veeam Monitor, Vmtree, Nagios, etc.), machine state monitoring (e.g. 
Virtualshield, Logcheck, etc.), and security monitoring (e.g. intrusion detection, honeypots, 
etc.). However, these tools may not be suitable for security audit controls of virtualization 
infrastructures as physical controls can be distributed that will require onsite checks by the 
local controllers. There is a strong need of a new set of matrices for measuring security 
strength. With more reliable matrices, new check-pointing models need to be developed. 
Besides these technical requirements for carrying out security audit of the virtualisation 
infrastructures, there is also a need of new regulations/legislations for the cross-border 
deployment of resources used in virtualisation infrastructures. 
Digital Investigations of Virtualisation Infrastructures 
While virtualization infrastructures are poised to drive cybercrimes in the near future [24], 
these virtualisation infrastructures (such as Clouds) have no ‘forensic friendly’ design 
characteristics. Therefore, classical investigation techniques (such as confiscation of 
computing resource, copying and analysing digital contents) is not feasible as unplugging of 
a Cloud is not the option its stakeholder are willing to choose! Moreover, a Cloud is 
required to copy the contents of the Cloud under investigation. Furthermore, another Cloud 
is required to have computational capacity to analyse the contents of the Cloud being 
analysed. The current practice of carrying out digital investigations of Clouds involves 
analysis of individual computers connected to a Cloud. These investigations include 
recovery of connection details, logins, and data exchange to establish the sequence of 
actions carried out on the Clouds and to eventually demarcate the responsibilities. The 
Cloud operations are therefore not affected by these investigations of individual PCs. 
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However, this paradigm is not sustainable in the advent of shrinking features on the client 
side of Clouds. Complete externalisation of software artefacts (from the operating systems 
to the applications) will not provide any meaningful information to the investigators. This 
paradigm is already realised in ‘Cloud PCs’ (e.g. Wyse technology’s X00m Cloud PC [25]). 
Dell’s takeover of Wyse technology to expand their enterprise business heralds a 
widespread use of Cloud PCs in the very near future. Cloud PC X00m has only 2GB RAM 
with no storage or optical device connected to it. Digital forensics analysis could not be 
performed on these Cloud PCs without including Cloud infrastructure in the investigations. 
This paradigm will give birth to a number of serious security challenges including 
operational challenges (such business continuity assurances for the customers) as well as 
legal challenges (notably acceptability of the proofs originating from a ‘virtual’ world). 
BonFIRE Security Experiment 
European Future Internet experimental facility and experimentally driven research project 
BonFIRE [26] is executing a security monitoring experiment that aims to examine the 
implications of security on the virtualisation infrastructures – i.e. federated Cloud 
infrastructures. This experiment – ExSec: Experimenting Scalability of Continuous Security 
Monitoring – aims to develop a mean of quantifying the impact on security functions under 
various operating conditions and parameters of federated Cloud deployments. The results 
of this experimental study will help businesses to identify the best security architecture that 
will fit their Cloud architectures and performance requirements.  
The main objectives of the ExSec experiment is to study and quantify the impact on the 
quality of protection of Future Internet based virtualisation infrastructures that will be highly 
scalable in nature and use heterogeneous underlying technologies. These experimental 
evaluations will be useful to determine the stretching limit of Cloud security functions; and 
eventually, workout some remedial solutions especially to explore the possibility of making 
use of abundance of Cloud resources to compensate the performance degradation. 
Perspectives of International Cooperation 
Virtualization infrastructures envision a number of promising benefits for global businesses 
such as resource management, service provisioning and cost effectiveness. However, the 
scope of these infrastructures requires them to be dependable and secure, as markets will 
depend on them, as much as governments, to function properly. Globalisation of computing 
and storage resources require security solutions at the global scale, otherwise it will be 
impossible to achieve concrete security assurances for these infrastructures. International 
collaboration is crucial for ensuring security of the emerging networked society’s core 
architecture whether it is security audit framework for virtual infrastructures or their digital 
investigations. 
Recent economic meltdown has shown the degree of dependence at the global scale in 
general and among the emerging and developed economies in particular. This situation 
obliges us to take some international dimension for virtualisation security. It is understood 
that bringing different societies and cultures to a common understanding of security 
requirements is not trivial. Even member states of politico-economic blocs such as 
European Union maintain conflicting views of IT security [27]. Still, we need to involve all 
the stakeholders in a constructive cooperation to workout a common vision for securing 
virtual infrastructures. Significant breakthrough could be made if some business dimensions 
are added by bringing commercial stakeholders on-board. For example, best practices 
proposed by payment card industries (such as VISA & MASTER) are adopted and followed 
by all the players irrespective of their political and societal affiliations. Without some 
effective international cooperation, there will be a number of Achilles’ heels that malicious 
entities will use to attack the critical information infrastructures from their safe havens with 
complete impunity. 
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3.2.8 Implications arising from identity and privacy related issues on a global 
scale 
Animator: Alberto Crespo, Atos Spain S.A. 
The powerful technological, social, economic and political drivers of globalisation are 
shaping the evolution of electronic services towards greater integration through 
management of complex relationships spanning across borders and world regional areas. 
The complex ecosystem of greater cross-border information flows opens opportunities for 
creation of wealth in modern knowledge societies, but also risks to individual fundamental 
rights and freedoms, especially privacy. The goal then must be to ensure public networks 
are more natively trustworthy, providing privacy-protecting, secure and identity-based 
online interactions which prevent misuse of personal data. 
The trust in the emerging eServices in the areas of cloud computing, mobility, Internet of 
Things, Future Internet, etc. essentially depends on the realisation of a highly interoperable 
techno-legal layer that enables privacy-respecting and trustworthy electronic identity 
services. This should be manageable dynamically as a service with proper auditability and 
accountability and should be bi-directional allowing to establish reliable identification of all 
parties involved in potentially composable transactions where legal certainty as to 
applicable jurisdiction needs to match the emerging nature of new ICT paradigms. 
International cooperation is key to achieve the mentioned goal of enhancing trustworthiness 
of ICT systems operating on a global scale, allowing a more effective prevention and 
combating of multiple forms of cybercrime and large-scale threats to security and privacy, 
e.g. identity-related crimes of fraud and theft. 
Such international cooperation requires articulation at several levels: political, 
organisational, technical, semantic, cultural, social, etc. Each of these layers requires 
involving several stakeholders in a trans-border dialogue which addresses specific 
problems and goals: from decision-makers and public sector agencies, to industry (ICT 
companies, electronic components manufacturers, service providers, security solutions 
integrators, etc.), NGO’s (e.g. consumer associations or other advocacy groups), 
commerce institutions, international standardisation bodies, etc. The mutual cooperation 
can yield significant progress in the following fields: 
• Effective engineering and technical solutions (e.g. PETs) to embed privacy by 
default and into the design of ICT systems. 
• Interoperable electronic and Internet-based identity schemes allowing federation 
and cross-border, cross-domain, cross-sector interactions. 
• Privacy respecting identity management involving private and government third 
parties: identity/attribute providers, service composition… In particular, this requires 
international agreement on consistent metrics and assurance levels as well as basic 
understanding and acceptance of common fundamental principles1213 underlying 
different data protection legislations which may be universally appliccable as a 
general framework (while recognising local specificities). 
                                               
 
12 Principles of proportionality, purpose specification, lawfulness/fairness and rights of access, rectification, 
deletion, objection as stated in 2009 Madrid Declaration of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners. 
13 Principles of proportionality, purpose specification, lawfulness/fairness and rights of access, rectification, 
deletion, objection as stated in 2009 Madrid Declaration of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners. 
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 48 of 65 
 
• More dependable ICT infrastructure articulated over mechanisms for accountability, 
liability, audit, compliance monitoring, enforcement… even across hetereogeneous 
legal and trust domains.  
Still, such efforts may fail if they don’t place at the center of their approaches the citizens 
and consumers in a user-centric manner, which effectively empowers people using 
technology (whose life is changing rapidly by it too). User’s trust in e-Relations depends on 
their effective participation with choices to decide which personal data is to be released 
under specific conditions which gives the feeling of being in control (digital sovereignty and 
informational self-determination). The new draft of EU Data Protection Regulation 
constitutes a good basis in this direction and constitutes a good framework for discussion 
with other important countries seeking complementarity at policy level: Australia, Canada, 
the US, Brazil, APEC countries, etc. 
International cooperation on fields like identity management assurance and e-Signature can 
yield valuable results allowing for the secure transmission of information with increased 
trust in its provenance (e.g. personal data attributes certified by reliable sources) or the 
effective establishment of architectures based on privacy-enhancing credentials where 
applicable (e.g. anonymous credentials, use of claims-based assertions). Furthermore, 
cooperation on usability of ICT can make systems easier to use for all citizens, with greater 
focus accessibility, multilingual interfaces and common approaches to informed online 
consent (e.g. allowing precise descriptions of destination of personal data and purpose of 
its collection and processing). 
The existing visions on identity management ecosystems and interoperable eID 
infrastructures (e.g. OATH and NSTIC in the US, STORK in the EU, Kantara initiative, etc.) 
have potential to effectively build ‘bridges’ on a global scale, using existing solutions as 
‘building blocks’ which are respectful of already working schemes at national levels. The EU 
can provide lessons learned from its experience in this area when it comes to making 
national systems (be it for health, justice, public procurement, public services for business 
or eID) interoperable in the context of larger pan-European frameworks which are 
respectful of existing technical, legal and organisational frameworks at national levels. It is 
thus possible to build solutions that work at a large-scale, connecting smaller-scale 
solutions by means of open standards and technologies (e.g. for effective translation of 
attributes names and values across heterogeneous domains), bringing unprecedented 
growth to our economies while satisfying the expectations from end-users in terms of 
personal data protection and trustworthy operation of ICT systems. At the level of eID 
management, STORK project has proven the feasibility of de-centralized approach to 
enable around 30 electronic services portals from 15 different European countries to 
authenticate securely foreign users presenting their national eIDs (more than 110 different 
eIDs are supported). Besides authentication of citizens, it is important to build semantically-
rich solutions, like STORK 2.0 will do, which allow to represent and manage across borders 
roles, mandates and powers of representation to act on behalf of legal persons. 
Solutions for adequate and explicit management of trust will be key in building globalized 
frameworks. This requires not only establishing trust chains that rely on technical 
mechanisms (authenticity and integrity of exchanged messages in commonly agreed 
formats) but also agreements to establish mutually recognised organisational measures 
(e.g. security audits, compliance with security standards, etc.) to determine with sufficient 
formality that involved subsystems and nodes are secure (e.g. sets of common minimum 
standards of data security rules and policies can be agreed and certified by mutually 
recognised third parties or Memorandums of Understanding signed). Pragmatic approaches 
should be sought as well in the area of Service Level Agreements and liabilities of involved 
parties. 
In the area of data protection, international-level exchanges of personal data must intensify 
upon the basis of application domains and corresponding risks and benefits and focusing 
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on eliciting common understandings on concepts and principles which may be very 
differently understood in different areas of the world, e.g. “proportionality”, “data 
minimisation”, “anonymous data”, “sensitive data”, “legitimacy of processing”, “informed 
consent”, “data controller or custodian”, “data processor”, etc. Similarly, bases should be 
laid down for allowing international flows of personal data with sufficient guarantees to the 
respect of fundamental rights of data subjects in the originating countries (focus of 
cooperation in this field should examine the available options, e.g. bilateral agreements like 
EU-US Safe Harbor, grounds for ‘adequacy decisions’, binding corporate rules, contractual 
clauses, safeguards supporting privacy and standard clauses for data protection that 
privacy commissioners / DPAs may determine…). While addressing the complexity of 
national privacy laws (established in over 60 countries) may be too ambitious, discussion 
may take place on the basis of regional approaches (e.g. EU DPD/Regulation, APEC 
Privacy Framework). This kind of analysis can address underlying differences in approach: 
human-rights vs commerce-based, geography vs organisation focus, denial of flows of 
personal data unless legal basis present vs allow data flows with powers to limit them in 
some circumstances… 
Finally, there is room for substantial progress in the following areas: 
• Fostering good privacy practices as business differentiating factor: at same price 
people choose privacy-friendly vendors (privacy should “stand-out” for users) 
• Consumers need a ‘choice menu’: choosing between personalised services that 
require identification and other services that minimise collection of personal data. 
Privacy notices should be available with clear language so user can compare with 
other providers. Consent should not be abusively used to process personal data. 
• Support of data portability (e.g. profile portability between providers) subject to 
consent. 
• Removal of excessive bureaucratic restrictions (e.g. approvals/regulatory filings) 
which create inefficiency. 
• Encouraging organisationally-based transfer mechanisms (i.e. BCR, codes of 
practice, targeted audits, privacy seals…).  
• Enforcement should focus more on the transfers that have greatest risk. 
• Ways for implementing transparency and better rules for jurisdiction application 
(avoiding frictions between laws). 
3.2.9 Internet of Things 
Animator(s): Carmen Fernandez Gago, Gerardo Fernandez Navarrete, NICS Lab - 
University of Malaga, Spain. With additional contributions from Rodrigo Roman Castro, 
Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore and Javier Lopez, NICS Lab - University of 
Malaga, Spain. 
There has been considerable research work undertaken in Europe on the Internet of Things 
and roadmapping activities looking at the future research needs for the concept known as 
the “Internet of Things”. There are a number of widely used definitions for Internet of 
Things, including the following: 
“Things having identities and virtual personalities operating in smart spaces using intelligent 
interfaces to connect and communicate within social, environmental, and user contexts.  
Interconnected objects having an active role in what might be called the Future Internet.” 
source: Internet of Things in 2020 - Roadmap for the Future. May 2008 [28] 
“Objects will sometimes have their own Internet Protocol addresses, be embedded in 
complex systems and use sensors to obtain information from their environment and/or use 
actuators to interact with it”. source: Internet of Things – An action plan for Europe. June 
2009 [29] 
“A dynamic global network infrastructure with self configuring capabilities based on 
standard and interoperable communication protocols - Physical and virtual “things” have 
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identities, physical attributes, and virtual personalities and use intelligent interfaces, and are 
seamlessly integrated into the information network.” source: Internet of Things – Strategic 
Research Roadmap. September 2009 [30] 
All IoT definitions revolve around the same central concept: “a world-wide network of 
interconnected objects” with the following attributes: existence, sense of 'self', connectivity, 
interactivity, dynamicity, and sense of environmental awareness. 
Therefore, a global approach must be taken to address the trust and security aspects of the 
Internet of Things and WG2 of BIC is a very useful place for addressing these.  
As shown in Figure 8, there are a number of top level security research challenges.  In 
summary, the challenges are the following:  
Protocol and network security to deal with the large number of objects with 
significant heterogeneity. This would involve improved cryptography to make them operate 
in smaller environments requiring faster operation while keeping same levels of security so 
far. A Key management infrastructure is needed for the open configuration of IoT, in which 
the new systems need to be able to manage the keys in objects of small size where the 
current certificate based systems wouldn't work. The current Internet protocols are not 
usable in these environments. 
Data and Privacy as carrying multitudes of objects can bring up a lot of privacy issues 
as they are not operating in an isolated way. This area can be addressed by using Privacy 
by Design (user should be able to decide which of his/her information and how it is being 
used); Privacy by Default (right to be forgotten); transparency (he should know when it is 
being used), and improved data and information management.  
Identity management, which must be taken from a different perspective in IoT in 
which objects will have a core identity and yet a temporary identity must be possible. ID 
management systems should encompass Identification (how to define the identity of a 
"Thing"); Authentication (infrastructure that allows mutual authentication based on 
Centralized,  Distributed, Local, Global, Attributes); and Authorization based on delegation 
(e.g. stethoscope) and granularity (e.g. classroom provides class schedule to everyone, 
syllabus only provided to students). 
Trust and governance is required in order to obtain trust between the different objects 
(and from the user perspective). For the IoT, a trust management system is especially 
required inside in order to gain trust management from the user perspective. From the 
system perspective, governance is very important where policies should be contained and 
where the policies vs. control is dealt with;  
Fault tolerance as the perimeters of the networks do not exist any more in IoT. 
Therefore, attackers will be all around and there is a need to provide solutions with the 
following attributes - Secure by default (Patch Tuesday?), Internal State and the ability to 
provide self - defence recovery. 
Also shown in figure 8, there are two special “foundational challenges”, including those 
related that are Properties / Application-specific. These are basic properties that all 
challenges must consider (e.g. Interoperability, Scalability, Resilience) and to the high-level, 
application-specific security mechanisms that make use of all the challenges above (e.g. 
Secure discovery of services); and Architecture. Within a system, it is necessary to 
provide some architectural support to integrate the different security services. 
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Figure 8. Trust and Security research challenges in IoT 
 
3.2.9 Photos from the session 
 
 
 
 
WG2. breakout session 
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4. Conclusions 
The BIC project has organised a major workshop held over two full days in Brussels on 21-
22 June 2012 with  the participation of over 40 experts in different domains of international 
cooperation and trustworthy ICT,  coming from 15 different countries (from Australia, United 
States, India, Brazil, and from Norway to South Africa). 
Day 1 of the workshop (21st June 2012) focused on cross domain activities of international  
cooperation and Day 2 (22nd June 2012), focussed on technical themes in trustworthy ICT 
and international cooperation. The experts participating in the first day targeted strategic 
and tactical perspectives of INCO activities dealing with advantages and disadvantages of 
multilateral and bilateral approaches, what the current mechanisms are, barriers and 
obstacles, regional differences and they provided valuable comments on the best way to 
move forward. 
Day 2 of the workshop (22nd June 2012) was structured in two parallel full-day sessions; the 
first working group focused on a multidisciplinary approach to trustworthy ICT human 
oriented, citizen centric; the second working group focused on the need for international 
cooperation for enabling the protection of networks and systems. 
The multidisciplinary approach adopted by the BIC consortium for inviting and selecting the 
experts attending the sessions  resulted in a fruitful and beneficial sessions with high level 
of knowledge transfer, sharing all type of experiences and coming to interesting 
conclusions that can provide useful hints for defining future programs in international 
cooperation. 
A multi-lateral approach international cooperation approach in RTD initiatives 
complementing the predominant bi-lateral initiatives is suggested by the BIC International 
Advisory Group (IAG) and a high level basic structure is proposed and detailed for 
discussions. The IAG is there to suggest and formulate policies, processes and 
mechanisms to achieve international cooperation in the area of the ICT Trust and Security 
community. Three independent working groups have been formed as defined in the BIC 
IAG Terms of Reference and this workshop was their launch face to face meetings.  
The multi-dimensional approach necessary for trust, privacy and security, and the 
difficulties in addressing all the cross-implications, go far beyond pure technological issues.  
The following are some of the key points raised by the experts during the workshop.  The 
recurrent theme is the need for international cooperation and collaboration to address what 
is inherently a global – international – challenge. 
• take full cognisance of the point of view of the end-users; take into account the real 
needs of the citizens; stop designing security solutions from the point of view of 
security experts only. 
• The notion that - Privacy is dead – get used to it – as asserted by some quarters 
needs to be examined; the rise of social networking online may mean that (some, in 
cases many) people no longer have expectations of privacy; therefore, internationally-
based socio-technical initiatives are necessary to support and develop such concepts 
as privacy as essential components of modern society. 
• trust management in secure software: the scale of the emerging global 
infrastructures, combined with the need for fully autonomous operation, surpass the 
capability of existing security infrastructures such as authorization services, certificate 
issuance and validation services; having a certified identity (maybe granted using 
sloppy/undocumented procedures) in a dynamic and open environment does not give 
a priori guarantee of acceptable behaviour and performance of software and services; 
in particular, it is not enough for informed decisions on access restrictions and control, 
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the selection among potential candidates for interaction; trust is a first-class object 
that needs to be evaluated, analyzed, used, negotiated. 
• as more aspects of business and personal lives shift into this cyber world of online 
services, concerns have arisen over how we can have confidence that they will 
protect and handle data and information responsibly;  accountability can help us 
tackle these challenges in trust and complexity; accountability is enshrined in 
regulatory frameworks for data protection across the globe; to increase trust we must 
address the needs of all stakeholders – users, providers and regulators; an 
orchestrated set of mechanisms: preventive (mitigating risk), detective (monitoring 
and identifying policy violation) and corrective (managing incidents and providing 
redress), using interdisciplinary co-design to ensure that legal and business 
processes and technical mechanisms work in support of each other should be 
addressed. 
• when we see data on the web, currently, we do not know where it comes from and 
how it got there; this information and its source (provenance) is typically lost in the 
process of copying/ transcribing/transforming databases; assurance of provenance is 
essential to data integrity, currency and reliability.  
• social computing is enabling user-centric, collaborative knowledge sharing to build 
communities of people using the Internet in South Africa and also in Africa generally, 
eg,  Mxit (www.Mxit.com); the key to whose success lies in its simplicity; the interface 
is text-based not graphical; it can work on nearly any mobile phone; in developing 
countries such as in Africa; mobile phones can be used as a tool to intervene and act 
as a competitive force in the social, economical and political development. 
• A Personalized Identity Management (PIM) ecosystem is needed in which individuals 
can manage digital identities and control the exchange of identity information; under 
GINI-SA, which is a Support Action for the European Commission aimed to analyse 
this vision, individuals would manage their identities by means of an Individual Digital 
Identity (INDI), a self-generated and self-managed digital identity, which is verifiable 
against one or more authoritative data sources. 
• attackers will soon start developing automated techniques to customize attack s 
based on private user information and aggregated data collected from multiple online 
sources; Cloud computing, online social networks, smart meters, SCADA Networks 
are potential targets for international cooperation; new and emerging technologies 
need to be studied from a security point of view. 
• the trends towards cloud computing and towards the Internet of things are already on 
the future research agenda in cryptology; in the area of cryptographic algorithms, the 
main challenge is to push the limits for high speed performance in the cloud and to 
optimize the energy and footprint for the Internet of things; as the developments of 
cloud computing and the Internet of things are global developments, there is a 
corresponding need for strong international collaboration on a strategic research 
agenda in cryptology. 
• smart phones, mobile apps, remote data, consumerization of IT and the rise of 
malware and criminal intent present a lethal cocktail of security threats to the 
consumer, business and commerce, the communications – particularly mobile – 
networks, and the whole societal infrastructure; at the core of addressing such 
security threat to the digital environment are two basic concepts - intrusion detection 
system, and intrusion prevention system; coordination and collaboration are required 
to create a centralized body (like ITU) the can formulate regulatory policies, define 
standards, tools and test beds, organize coordination amongst scattered research 
bodies and entities, and organize consolidation and compilation of available and 
BIC Workshop on success metrics and technical working groups 
Page 54 of 65 
 
ongoing work, organizing their development; The International Advisory Group (IAG) 
within BIC can make a major contribution in developing the groundwork for this. 
• the protection of the Critical Infrastructure(s) is an international concern that must be 
urgently addressed with a multi-dimensional; research is ongoing to define a 
construct of National Information Security Index (NISI) in Indian context using 
combination of Delphi and AHP; interim findings of the research and illustrative use of 
NISI to measure a nation’s security index provide a template for design and 
computation of a sector-specific security index. 
• virtualization infrastructures offer a number of promising benefits for global 
businesses such as resource management, service provisioning and cost 
effectiveness; however, the scope of these infrastructures requires them to be 
dependable and secure, as markets will depend on them, as much as governments, 
to function properly; globalisation of computing and storage resources require security 
solutions at the global scale, otherwise it will be impossible to achieve concrete 
security assurances for these infrastructures; international collaboration is crucial for 
ensuring security of the emerging core architecture of the networked society: whether 
it is security audit framework for virtual infrastructures or digital investigation and 
corrective action. 
• trust in the emerging eServices in the areas of cloud computing, mobility, Internet of 
Things, Future Internet, etc. essentially depends on the realisation of a highly 
interoperable techno-legal layer that enables privacy-respecting and trustworthy 
electronic identity services; international cooperation is key to achieving the goal of 
enhancing the trustworthiness of ICT systems operating on a global scale, allowing a 
more effective prevention and combating of multiple forms of cybercrime and large-
scale threats to security and privacy, e.g. identity-related crimes of fraud and theft.  
A change in approach from the existing bi-lateral, e.g., EU-India, EU- Brazil, EU- SA, to 
multi-lateral is suggested as well as a possible multi-lateral structure, with a Core Working 
Group (CWG); based on a structure of the BIC IAG, Extended Working Groups (EWGs) 
specific for each participating country and Special Function Groups, operating under EWGs 
as specialists at functional level. With this in mind, a proposal for coordination and multi-
lateral approach is presented taking into account the discussions at the workshop is 
included in Annex 2. 
It is important to note that the building of international cooperation is even difficult when 
using a bi-lateral approach as it takes significant time for each of the parties to come 
together on a bi-lateral basis to try to align their activities and priorities. Therefore, it is 
exponentially more difficult for a multi-lateral approach when building a longer term strategy 
as proposed within the workshop. The BIC project has proposed a strategy and will follow 
up in the near future with interested countries as exemplars. 
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5.2 Link to the Workshop Webpage, where all slides can be found. 
http://www.bic-trust.eu/events/bic-workshop-on-the-cross-domain-coordination-of-
international-cooperation-day-1-and-technical-themes-in-trustworthy-ict-and-inco-day-2/ 
5.3 Reminder list of upcoming events 
Date Venue Event Description 
26-
27th 
Sept 
2012 
Warsaw, 
Poland 
Information 
Day and 
networking 
session on 
EU – Japan 
cooperation. 
Information day on whole work programme in 
Warsaw, Poland on 26 and 27 September 2012.  
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/ictpr
oposersday/2012/index_en.htm 
In addition, concerning the EU-Japan R&D activity, 
a dedicated page has been opened where you can 
submit your ideas, partner search, and take this 
opportunity to be part of the EU-Japan networking 
session that takes place on 27 September 2012. 
You will find the relevant additional information at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/cf/ic
tpd12/item-display.cfm?id=8435 
10-
11th 
Oct.  
2012 
Limassol, 
Cyprus 
Annual 
Privacy 
Forum 
http://privac
yforum.eu/ 
 
The Annual Privacy Forum 2012 (APF’2012) is 
being held on the 10th and 11th of October 2012 in 
Cyprus. The forum is being organised by ENISA in 
collaboration with DG CONNECT, University of 
Cyprus and Cyprus Presidency of the Council of 
the EU. The provisional programme is available on 
the website http://privacyforum.eu/programme and 
registration is available at 
http://privacyforum.eu/programme/registration. 
Note: registration is required by the end of 
September 2012. 
27th 
Nov.  
2012 
Lisbon, 
Portugal 
BIC 
International 
Advisory 
Group 
meeting and 
Workshop 
As Lisbon is a good gateway for the BIC countries, 
the BIC forum would be 27th Nov. 2012 and would 
consist of the International Advisory Group (IAG) 
meeting (by invitation only) in the morning and an 
open forum workshop in the afternoon. This would 
raise impact for both BIC and the 2012 Africa-EU 
Cooperation Forum, which starts on 28th Nov. 
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Date Venue Event Description 
2012 
28-
29th 
Nov.  
2012 
Lisbon, 
Portugal 
2012 Africa-
EU 
Cooperation 
Forum on 
ICT'  
Now in its 5th edition, 2012 Africa-EU Cooperation 
Forum on ICT will be held in Lisbon (Portugal) on 
Nov. 28-29, 2012. 
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Technology - TSSG 
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Alberto Crespo Atos Spain S.A. Spain 
Paul Cunningham IIMC International 
Information Management 
Ireland 
Claudia Diaz COSIC KU Leuven 
Rado Faletic Forum for European-
Australian Science & 
Technology cooperation 
Australia 
Carmen Fernandez Gago University of Malaga Spain 
Gerardo Fernandez Navarrete NICS Lab - University of 
Malaga 
Spain 
Kraus Fernando Atos Spain Spain 
Katrin Franke Norwegian Information 
Security Laboratory 
Norway 
Alan Hartman IBM Israel 
Sotiris Ioannidis FORTH Greece 
Vishal Jain 451 Research United Kingdom 
Ashok Kar Infra Technologies France 
Katja Legisa TESEO Belgium 
Lefteris Leondaridis NetSmart S.A. Greece   
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Name Organisation Country 
John C.Mallery CSAIL Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology 
Fabio Martinelli National Research Council 
of Italy 
Italy 
Alberto Masoni INFN - National Institute of 
Nuclear Physics 
Italy 
Kay Matzner Fraunhofer Institute for 
Factory Operation und 
Automation 
Germany 
Mounib Mekhilef Ability Europe Ltd. France 
Martin Muehleck European Commission DG INFSO 
Syed Naqvi CETIC Belgium 
Nick Papanikolaou HP Labs United Kingdom 
Bart Preneel COSIC KU Leuven 
Michel Riguidel Telecom ParisTech France 
Julián Seseña ROSE VISION Spain 
Abhishek Sharma Beyond Evolution Tech 
Solution Pvt. Ltd. 
India 
Parminder Jeet Singh IT for Change India 
Priscila Solis Barreto University of Brasilia Brazil 
Neeraj Suri TU Darmstadt Germany 
Barend Taute Council for Scientific and 
Industrial Research Meraka 
Institute 
South Africa 
Camille Torrenti Sigma Orionis France 
Yolanda Ursa INMARK Spain 
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Annexe 1. UN Resolution – Creation of a global culture of 
cybersecurity 
United Nations  A/RES/57/239 
General Assembly  Distr.: General 
 31 January 2003 
  
Fifty-seventh session 
Agenda item 84 (c) 
 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 
[on the report of the Second Committee (A/57/529/Add.3)] 
57/239. Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity 
 
The General Assembly, 
Noting the growing dependence of Governments, businesses, 
other organizations and individual users on information 
technologies for the provision of essential goods and services, the 
conduct of business and the exchange of information, 
Recognizing that the need for cybersecurity increases as 
countries increase their participation in the information society, 
Recalling its resolutions 55/63 of 4 December 2000 and 56/121 
of 19 December 2001 on establishing the legal basis for combating 
the criminal misuse of information technologies, 
Recalling also its resolutions 53/70 of 4 December 1998, 54/49 
of 1 December 1999, 55/28 of 20 November 2000, 56/19 of 29 
November 2001 and 57/53 of 22 November 2002 on developments 
in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of 
international security, 
Aware that effective cybersecurity is not merely a matter of 
government or law enforcement practices, but must be addressed 
through prevention and supported throughout society, 
Aware also that technology alone cannot ensure cybersecurity 
and that priority must be given to cybersecurity planning and 
management throughout society, 
Recognizing that, in a manner appropriate to their roles, 
government, business, other organizations, and individual owners 
and users of information technologies must be aware of relevant 
cybersecurity risks and preventive measures and must assume 
responsibility for and take steps to enhance the security of these 
information technologies, 
Recognizing also that gaps in access to and the use of 
information technologies by States can diminish the effectiveness 
of international cooperation in combating the criminal misuse of 
information technology and in creating a global culture of 
cybersecurity, and noting the need to facilitate the transfer of 
information technologies, in particular to developing countries, 
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Recognizing further the importance of international cooperation for 
achieving cybersecurity through the support of national efforts 
aimed at the enhancement of human capacity, increased learning 
and employment opportunities, improved public services and 
better quality of life by taking advantage of advanced, reliable and 
secure information and communication technologies and networks 
and by promoting universal access, 
Noting that, as a result of increasing interconnectivity, 
information systems and networks are now exposed to a growing 
number and a wider variety of threats and vulnerabilities which 
raise new security issues for all, Noting also the work of relevant 
international and regional organizations on enhancing 
cybersecurity and the security of information technologies,  
1.  Takes note of the elements annexed to the present 
resolution, with a view to creating a global culture of cybersecurity;  
2.  Invites all relevant international organizations to consider, 
inter alia, these elements for the creation of such a culture in any 
future work on cybersecurity; 
3.  Invites Member States to take into account these elements, 
inter alia, in their efforts to develop throughout their societies a 
culture of cybersecurity in the application and use of information 
technologies; 
4.  Invites Member States and all relevant international 
organizations to take, inter alia, these elements and the need for a 
global culture of cybersecurity into account in their preparations for 
the World Summit on the Information Society, to be held at 
Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003 and at Tunis in 2005; 
5. Stresses the necessity to facilitate the transfer of information 
technology and capacity-building to developing countries, in order 
to help them to take measures in cybersecurity. 
 
78th plenary meeting 
20 December 2002 
Annexe 
Elements for creating a global culture of cybersecurity 
Rapid advances in information technology have changed the 
way Governments, businesses, other organizations and individual 
users who develop, own, provide, manage, service and use 
information systems and networks (“participants”) must approach 
cybersecurity. A global culture of cybersecurity will require that all 
participants address the following nine complementary elements: 
(a)  Awareness. Participants should be aware of the need for 
security of information systems and networks and what they can 
do to enhance security; 
(b)  Responsibility. Participants are responsible for the security 
of information systems and networks in a manner appropriate to 
their individual roles. They should review their own policies, 
practices, measures and procedures regularly, and should assess 
whether they are appropriate to their environment; 
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(c)  Response. Participants should act in a timely and 
cooperative manner to prevent, detect and respond to security 
incidents. They should share information about threats and 
vulnerabilities, as appropriate, and implement procedures for rapid 
and effective cooperation to prevent, detect and respond to 
security incidents. This may involve cross-border information-
sharing and cooperation; 
(d)  Ethics. Given the pervasiveness of information systems 
and networks in modern societies, participants need to respect the 
legitimate interests of others and recognize that their action or 
inaction may harm others; 
(e) Democracy. Security should be implemented in a manner 
consistent with the values recognized by democratic societies, 
including the freedom to exchange thoughts and ideas, the free 
flow of information, the confidentiality of information and 
communication, the appropriate protection of personal information, 
openness and transparency; 
(f) Risk assessment. All participants should conduct periodic 
risk assessments that identify threats and vulnerabilities; are 
sufficiently broad-based to encompass key internal and external 
factors, such as technology, physical and human factors, policies 
and third-party services with security implications; allow 
determination of the acceptable level of risk; and assist in the 
selection of appropriate controls to manage the risk of potential 
harm to information systems and networks in the light of the nature 
and importance of the information to be protected; 
(g) Security design and implementation. Participants should 
incorporate security as an essential element in the planning and 
design, operation and use of information systems and networks; 
(h) Security management. Participants should adopt a 
comprehensive approach to security management based on risk 
assessment that is dynamic, encompassing all levels of 
participants’ activities and all aspects of their operations; 
(i) Reassessment. Participants should review and reassess 
the security of information systems and networks and should make 
appropriate modifications to security policies, practices, measures 
and procedures that include addressing new and changing threats 
and vulnerabilities. 
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Annexe 2. Proposal for Coordination and Multi-Lateral Approach in 
International Cooperation 
As presented by BIC International Advisory Group (IAG) member, Abhishek Sharma, 
beTS, of Gurgaon, India during the workshop. 
As shown in Figure 9 of this report, the BIC International Advisory Group (IAG), is 
positioned to suggest and formulate the policies, processes and mechanisms to achieve 
international cooperation in the area of the ICT Trust and Security community. Three 
independent working groups, WG1, WG2 & WG3 with specific objectives as defined in the 
BIC IAG TOR, have been formed comprising specialists from different countries and 
different specializations. Indeed, these WGs form the backbone of the Project; however, 
they alone would not be enough to take the entire project forward to its logical conclusion. 
They would, therefore, need to be supported by additional Groups and Sub-Groups in a 
structured manner, at the management and functional level with defined focus area, role 
and responsibilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Overall structure of BIC project and external bodies 
 Since the nature of the project requires interactions amongst all participant countries 
to share the information, resources etc, the approach for the formal interactions, flow of 
information and smoothness of actions, it becomes natural that the groups and sub groups 
working for the project work closely with each other. Accordingly at international 
management level, it requires a change in approach from the existing bi-lateral approach 
i.e. EU-India, EU- Brazil, EU- SA etc to multi-lateral approach where each participating 
country develops a formal system for direct multi-lateral communication and interacts with 
each other besides interacting centrally as well. Of course the existence and role of a 
central body is essential for ensuring that the focus of the projects are not digressed and 
there is proper coordination amongst all adhering to the core principles and objectives of 
the project. 
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The following structure is thus proposed. 
1. Coordination Group Structure 
A multi-lateral supervisory structure under the auspices of the International advisory Group 
(IAG) with three main layers is proposed: 
1. A Core Working Group (CWG);  
2. Extended  Working Groups (EWGs) – specific for each participating country  
3. Special Function Groups (SFGs) – operating under EWGs as specialists at 
functional level. 
2. The suggested role and function  of this structure is as follows: 
The CWG is at present constituted with three working groups WG1, WG2 and WG3 with 
representation from all participant countries and people chosen from different 
specialization. The composition of the CWG, with the three WGs at present, may be 
reviewed from time to time to assess if these WGs are adequate to cover all aspects of the 
projects or if any new aspects have emerged or any gaps are being observed for which 
additional WGs would be needed.    
The role of the CWG is to address Strategy formulation, define high level objectives of the 
project and create a high level management structure and work flow processes to guide the 
project in the desired direction duly providing required support and assuming the overall 
leadership cum ownership position. 
The CWG should be supported by Extended Working Groups (EWGs) which needs to be 
formed at each member country (see figure 10). The CWG should define the eligibility 
criteria for EWG members. The country representatives within the CWG should then take 
up the responsibility of forming the EWG of the respective countries selecting out of the 
eligible individuals, Research Institutes and the companies, mainly SMEs. Voluntary 
participation should be one of the main criteria to join the EWG. The EWG members would 
be the key functional entities whose primary role would be to steer the project within the 
country.  
EWG would undertake the ownership of the following responsibilities:  
I. Identify local functionaries: Researchers, Govt., Industry 
II. Form a country specific consortium of functional entities with defined 
objectives, functions and deliverables. This consortium of functional entities 
may be labelled as Special Function Group (SFG) 
III.  Explain & Promote CWG Objectives & specific requirements to SFG by 
various means e.g. organizing regular workshops, seminars, events, 
interacting personally with other researchers and Govt. bodies thereby help 
forming a wider community. 
IV. Prepare the project plan, in accordance with Project Objective and with 
emphasis on Project Cost, Resource Requirements and time frame/ time lines 
with the major involvement and support of the SFG.  
V. Function as operational link between the CWG and SFG. 
VI. Monitor & Manage In-Country progress through regular meetings/ 
Conferences. 
VII. Gather Inputs & Process them: Analyze, Filter & Forward. 
VIII. Become a functional element for Multi-Lateral Cooperation, in that:  
• Interact closely with CWG and also EWGs of other countries 
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• Establish effective cooperation with other EWGs to share the work and 
resources mutually, in sync with the CWG. 
• Encourage and Support SFGs for multi-lateral cooperation. 
IX. Help prepare & consolidate Budgetary Estimates. If required, they will also 
help initiating the Proposals duly coordinating with CWG. 
X. Act as Committed Process Owners. 
 
CWG would undertake the ownership of the following responsibilities:  
I. Identifying, coordinating and consolidating the Research and Technology 
Development (RTD) work of EWGs  
II. Monitoring the progress of EWGs and ensuring sustained focus. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Basic structure of Core Working Groups and External Working Groups 
 
3. Priority Areas for Research & Development (PARD): 
Having formed the EWGs, CWG creates a high level list of Priority Areas for Research & 
Development (PARD) work and provides this list to EWGs for their respective assessment 
and opting for topics for the projects. 
EWG interacts with SFGs, analyses the list of research area provided and   reverts to CWG 
with their Proposed List of the Projects of Interest (PLPI). 
CWG analyzes the PLPI, selects the priority projects and consolidates all such project lists 
to prepare the List of Selected Projects. 
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4.  Project Assignment & Planning :  
On finalization of the Selected Project, assignment of the same to EWGs is done by CWG 
where the commitment of EWGs is obtained. Having assigned the projects, the next steps 
are the following:  
I. Prepare High Level Action Plan (HLAP) 
II. Develop Macro Project Plan (MPP):  Services of experienced Project 
Management professionals are obtained who are inducted at the CWG and 
EWG level at this stage. The MPP is prepared based on the micro level 
project plan obtained from EWGs. 
III. Consolidate and finalize the MPP for each EWG. 
IV. Analyze & Approve Project Resources as duly analyzed and proposed by 
EWGs. 
V. Budgetary Estimates are consolidated. Process for Allocation & Release of 
Funds and Disbursement Mechanism are also finalized along with the criteria 
and plan for disbursement. This may be done in sync with EC standards and 
processes. 
Monitoring & Review Process:  Define the process specifying Schedule, Milestones & 
Benchmarks 
Prepare Long Term Strategy: This should incorporate the following: 
I. Provision for New Challenges & Threats,  
II. Policy Review & Course Correction,  
III. New Projects and  
IV. Backup provisions for Management Team. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Strategy plays the most crucial role for the success of any project. When the size and 
complexities of the project assumes international dimensions, it is incumbent upon the main 
body to work out a proper strategy and define structures and processes. However, while on 
one hand it is essential to observe strict discipline to execute the projects as per plan, 
despite taking all care and precautions, possibility of unexpected future developments and 
new projects/ prospects cannot be ruled out. It would, therefore, be wise to incorporate 
provisions for flexibility and future changes in case of such wide and complex projects. 
